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I. Introduction
Recently, federal courts across the nation have been confronted
with the contention that telephone companies are immune from the
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.operation of the federal antitrust laws.' This contention raises the
much larger issue of the proper accommodation of antitrust and reg-
ulatory statutes, an issue infamous for the complex analytical diffi-
culties it has caused in the courts.
The argument presented by the telephone companies is essen-
tially that regulation under the Communications Act of 19342 is in-
herently and fundamentally inconsistent with the application of the
antitrust laws to the pervasively regulated telecommunications in-
dustry; therefore, the argument continues, the antitrust laws have
been impliedly repealed. 3 These claims have caused substantial con-
fusion in this entire area.4 Many advocates believe that the cases are
hopelessly irreconcilable.5 Suggestions for reform abound.6 There
are proposals for strict tests7 and for admittedly somewhat looser
1. See, e.g., Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g,
435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal. 1977); DASA Corp. v. General Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'g, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,610 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Mid-
Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980): Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979),
reP'g, 446 F. Supp. 1090 (D.N.J. 1978); In re AT&T v. United States, No. 78-2050 (D.C. Cit.
Oct. 31, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Industrial Communications Sys. v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1974); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T, 481 F. Supp. 120 (D.D.C.
1978); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. AT&T, 465 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); MCI Com-
munications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1978), cert denied, No. 78-7457 (7th
Cir. Nov. 30, 1978); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,960
(S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal dirmissed 568 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895
(1978); United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1071
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977), a'd on rehearing, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.C. 1978),
mandamus denied sub nom. In re AT&T, No. 78-2050 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 31, 1978); Chastain v.
AT&T, 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); People's Tel. Coop. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 399
F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Macom Prod. Corp. v. AT&T, 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal.
1973); International Tel.& Tel. v. General Telephone & Electric Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Haw. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), afrd on rehearing, 449 F.
Supp. 1158 (D. Haw. 1978).
2. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-155 (1976)).
3. See IT&T v. General Tel. & Elec. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1158, 1166-67 (D. Haw. 1978);
Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 435 F. Supp. 207, 209 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Ci.
1981); DASA Corp. v. General Tel. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61, 610 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981). See generaly Comment, The Application ofAntitrust Law
to Telecommunications, 69 CALiF. L. REV. 497 (1981).
4. Compare Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980), a ffg 1979-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,974 (S.D. Iowa 1979) with National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 628
F.2d 1950 (8th Cir. 1980), affg 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 1123
(1981).
5. See, e.g., Comment, Antitrust and Regulated Industries." A Critique and Proposalfor
Reform ofthe Implied Immunity Doctrine, 57 TEx. L. REV. 751 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 57
TEx. L. REV.]; Comment, A T&TandtheAntitrust Laws. A Strict Testfor Implied Immunity, 85
YALE L.J. 254, 257-58 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 85 YALE L.J.].
6. See note 5 supra; Comment, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry." Be-
yond Telerent, 86 YALE L.J. 538 (1977)."
7. It appears that the author of AT&Tand the Antitrust Laws.- A Strict Testfor Implied
Immunity, supra note 5, believes that a new formulation for decision-making with respect to
implied immunity is necessitated because of the pervasive regulation of the industry. 85 YALE
L.J., supra note 5, at 257. This test has been severely criticized. See I P. AREEDA & D. TuR-
NER, ANTrrrUST LAW 223b at 137-38 (1978); Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 43
* formulations.' Undeniably, some courts have been led astray.9 No
consistent rationale has yet emerged.
This article analyzes the arguments involved. After providing a
cohesive framework for analyzing the issue of implied repeal, the
authors conclude that implied antitrust immunity for telephone com-
panies is generally inappropriate.' 0 Reformulation of present law is
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 288 (1974). Accord MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp.
1072 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also note 258 infra note 162 infra
The author also believes that the case law is hopelessly irreconcilable. 85 YALE L.J. supra
note 5, at 257-58. The authors of this article simply do not share that belief. See notes 37-153
and accompanying text infra Because of this perceived confusion and the difficulty of recon-
ciling the cases, a strict test was offered to assist courts troubled by the concept of implied
immunity in the telecommunications field. The authors of this article believe that the strict test
is unnecessary, ill-advised, and misleading.
The "strict test" posits five factors that, if present, should result in implied immunity. 85
YALE L.J., supra note 5, at 257-58. The factors are as follows: (1) the conduct challenged in
the antitrust complaint, as well as rates, entry, and investment in the market should be contin-
ually subject to the regulatory agency's authority; (2) the agency should have the power to
grant the relief sought by the plaintifl (3) the agency should consider the benefits of competi-
tion in making its decision; (4) agency expertise should be particularly useful in making a
determination; and (5) the antitrust suit should involve important policy questions. 1d at 258.
Essentially the strict test is a factor-counting approach. It has been adopted by some
courts. See, e.g., Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 435 F. Supp. 207 [C.D. Cal: 1977), rev'd 664 F.2d
716 (9th Cir. 1981). The factor-counting approaches are inherently misleading because they
omit the ratio decidendi of the cases. See note 205 in/rz
8. A Critique and Proposalfor Reform of the Implied Immunity Doctrine, supra note 5,
also contends that a new approach must be taken for decision-making when the question of
implied antitrust immunity arises. The author states, "In its present form the doctrine is a
collection of unconnected legal tests, inconsistently applied, frequently irrelevant, and quite
unpredictable." 57 TEx. L. REv., supra note 5, at 756. We do not share this view. See text
accompanying notes 37-153 infra. Assuming irreconcilability of the case law, the author of A
Critique and Proposalfor Re/orm of the Implied Immwnity Doctrine endorses reformation of the
law and proposes a complete set of factors to assist confused jurists. 57 TEx. L. REV., supra
note 5passini Factors relevant to conflict determination according to the article are as follows:
(1) presumption against implied immunity, id at 67; (2) agency-regulation of the challenged
conduct, id at 767-70, (3) the "precise ingredient" test, id at 770, (4) agency authorization,
approval or sanction, ld at 770-71; (5) continuing agency supervision, i at 771; (6) agency
position on the issue of its authority to regulate, id at 771-72; and (7) the nature of the relief
sought in the complaint, id at 772-73.
Another eight factors are supposedly relevant for conflict resolution: (1) statutory author-
ization of the challenged conduct, i at 773-74; (2) congressional failure to extend express
immunity, i at 774-75; (3) pervasive regulation, i at 775-76; (4) necessity of implied immu-
nity, i d at 776-77; (5) agency authority to enforce the antitrust laws, i at 777-78; (6) agency
authority to consider competitive effects, id at 778-80, (7) agency authority to grant antitrust
immunity, i at 780-81; (8) existence of agency expertise, id at 871-82.
Such an approach is obviously awkward. Furthermore, it focuses on neither of the two
crucial aspects of the decision: irreconcilability and congressional intent.
9. Compare Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal. 1977) with Northeast-
ern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978); Essential Communications Sys., Inc.
v. AT&T, 446 F. Supp. 1090 (D.N.J. 1978) with Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T,
610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979); Macom Prod. Corp. v. AT&T, 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal.
1973)with DASA Corp. v. General Tel. Co., 1977-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,610 (C.D. Cal.
1977); IT&T v. GT&E, 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1972) and 449 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Hawaii
1978) with Western Elec. Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 1978-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61, 960
(S.D. Fla. 1976).
10. See generally text accompanying notes 221-315 infra. The exceptions are well stated
in United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.D.C. 1976). A narrow express antitrust
immunity for FCC approved mergers of operating telephone companies is codified at 47
U.S.C. § 221(a) (1976).
neither necessary nor desirableI' and the cases simply are not irrec-
oncilable.' 2 Rather, the law of implied repeal, when properly ap-
plied, satisfactorily resolves the questions presented. The
fundamental problem in the accommodation of antitrust and regula-
tory law is the articulation of a framework for analyzing the issues.
Such a framework has not been articulated in past antitrust cases,
but is established by the holdings of the Supreme Court in the area
of implied repeal generally.
II. A Framework for Analysis
Whether the antitrust laws apply is solely a matter of statutory
construction.' 3  It is not a matter of the jurisdiction of federal
courts.' 4 Ultimately, the issue is always one of congressional in-
tent.'5 The express intentions of Congress are embodied in the anti-
trust laws' 6 and in statutes expressly repealing the antitrust laws.' 7
11. See generally notes 7 and 8 supra.
12. The Supreme Court cases are discussed at notes 37-153 and accompanying text infra.
13. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352 (1963); United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939); Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610
F.2d 1114, 1117 n.8 (3d Cir. 1979); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp. 555 F.2d 687,
691 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied in part, 434 U.S. 1008, rev'd, 437 U.S. 322 (1978).
14. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See also Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. North-
west Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951); The Fair v. Kohler Die Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22 (1913); Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324, 1324 n.I (8th Cir. 1980). An example of the
confusion in this regard is Yellow Forwarding Co. v. Atlantic Container Line, 668 F.2d 350,
354 (8th Cir. 1981).
15. National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981); Phonetele, Inc.
v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1981); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Grey-
hound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1977); IT&T v. GT&E, 449 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (D.
Haw. 1978).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§1-30 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
Section 1 provides as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contact or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one mil-
lion dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the dis-
cretion of the court.
Section 2 provides as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars, if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
17. Illustrative statutes expressly repealing antitrust laws include the following: (1) Im-
munizing mergers, consolidations and acquisitions: Bank Merger Act of 1966, § (l)(a), 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976); Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2)(a), (11), 49 U.S.C. § 408, (11) (1970);
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970); see also Clayton Act § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (exempts from the antitrust laws mergers or acquisitions duly consummated
pursuant to authority given by the FCC, ICC, SEC, CAB, FMB and Secretary of Agriculture).
(2) Immunizing rate agreements: Reed-Bullwinkle Amendments § 208(a), 49 U.S.C. § 10706
(1976 & Supp. 1979) (providing ICC-approved agreements between carriers relating to rates,
Clearly Congress sometimes knows how to grant antitrust immunity
without ambiguity.
Congress, however, is not always unambiguous. As the
Supreme Court in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 18
noted, "[A] statutory scheme which does not create a total exception
from the antitrust laws may, nonetheless, in particular and discrete
instances, by implication grant immunity from an antitrust claim."'I9
Thus arises the question of implied repeal and what has been
called implied antitrust immunity. Implied antitrust immunity oc-
curs only because of an implied repeal of the antitrust laws by some
later regulatory statute.20  Such repeal is generally highly disfa-
vored.2 1 Implied repeals, however, are by no means confined to situ-
ations involving antitrust and regulatory statutes. An implied repeal
question arises whenever two or more statutes apply to any single
occurrence. 22 Ordinarily, as the Court stated in United States v. Bor-
fares, etc., with antitrust exemption on the making of such agreements); Shipping Act of 1916,
§§ 14(b), 15, 46 U.S.C. §§ 813a, 814 (1970) (agreements between carriers or between parties
subject to Act including rates, fares, etc., lawful under Act are exempt from antitrust laws);
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 412, 414, 49 U.S.C: §§ 1382, 1384 (1970). (3) Immunizing
pooling and other cooperative activities: Small Business Act §§ 7, 9, 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 638,
640 (1976) (exempting, inter alia, certain voluntary agreements and programs in furtherance of
the Act's objectives); Webb-Pomerene Act §§ 1-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976) (granting limited
exception for cooperative foreign trade); Fisherman's Collective Marketing Act §§ 1-2, U.S.C.
§§ 521-522 (1976) (exempting independent fishermen's organizations from the antitrust laws);
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) (existence and operation of labor, agricultural, and horti-
cultural organizations exempt).
18. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
19. Id at 385 n.14.
20. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 538, 550 (1974). For a discussion of this issue see
notes 271-309 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963); Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341,
357 (1963); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S.
439, 456 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
In United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) the court said
of the Sherman Act, "Language more comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face, it
shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business
whose activities might restrain or monopolize, commercial intercourse among the states." Id
at 553. This language was quoted with approval in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1978). See also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) ("The [Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of forbidden practices by whomever they
may be perpetrated"). This policy statement was recently quoted with approval in Pfizer, Inc.
v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978).
22. This article is concerned with implied repeal of antitrust laws by subsequent regula-
tory legislation. The United States Supreme Court recently indicated, however, that the prin-
ciples articulated in this article also apply to implied antitrust repeal by subsequent labor
legislation. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 42 U.S.L.W. 129, 133 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1982) (No. 18-
1345). See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental
Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1980); Larry v. Mucko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979); Consolidated Exp., Inc. v. New York
Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), peltionfor cert. filed, Nos. 78-1905 and 79-
221 (1979); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
Antitrust laws and patent laws must also be accommodated. Since patent laws were en-
acted before antitrust laws, the obverse of the implied repeal situation is presented. See gener-
den, "when there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to
give effect to both if possible."2
An implied repeal of one statute by a later statute occurs when
there is an affirmative showing of legislative intention to repeal the
earlier statute in the enactment of the later statute.24 The Court has
further stated that "in the absence of some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are
irreconcilable."25
Nor has the Court left us adrift in determining when statutes are
and are not to be considered "irreconcilable." In addressing that
very subject in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co. ,26 the Court quite
plainly set minimal bounds: "It is not enough to show that the two
statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual
situation for that no more than states the problem.
27
Settled law of statutory construction thus mandates a straight-
forward two-pronged analysis. The first question is whether an af-
firmative showing of legislative intention to repeal can be made. If
not, the question is simply whether the statutes are irreconcilable-
whether the statutes produce differing results. If no affirmative in-
tention to repeal exists and the statutes do not at least produce differ-
ing results, then "the problem disappears entirely, ' 28 and implied
repeal is simply impermissible.
Two types of distinctions must be clarified before the present
state of law in this area can be appreciated. First is the distinction
between primary jurisdiction and implied antitrust immunity. Sec-
ond are distinctions among the regulatory schemes themselves.
Primary jurisdiction and implied antitrust immunity are funda-
mentally different methods for accommodating the enforcement of
antitrust laws with regulatory obligations.29 Simply stated, implied
antitrust immunity determines who decides while primary jurisdic-
ally SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
23. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
24. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974).
25. Id (emphasis added).
26. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
27. Id. at 155.
28. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 308 (1973).
29. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction-sometimes referred to as primary decision, ex-
clusive primary jurisdiction, preliminary resort, or prior resort-does not govern judicial re-
view of administrative action. Rather, it governs the determination of whether the court or the
agency should make the initial determination. The doctrine only controls initial determina-
tion, not final determination. Often overlooked is the concept that agency jurisdiction may
only lay the groundwork for a later judicial determination of the critical questions. K. DAvIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 19.01 (1972) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvIS, TEXT]. See also K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, SUPPLEMENTARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 19.01 (1976) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS, TREATISE].
tion determines only who decides first.3" Over the years, the
courts-and the Supreme Court in particular-have sometimes used
similar labels to refer to these two very different doctrines. Implied
antitrust immunity is sometimes referred to as exclusive jurisdiction
or exclusive agency jurisdiction, while the primary jurisdiction con-
cept is referred to as exclusive preliminary jurisdiction.3 1 The loose
application of these labels and the similarity of the factual contexts
in which the issues arise has facilitated misunderstanding and
confusion.32
When the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies, it operates as
a reference to a special master under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 33 The master becomes familiar with the facts and
intricacies and reports to the court. In a primary jurisdictional con-
text, the master is a federal agency charged with expertise in dis-
charging its own regulatory obligations. After completing an
investigation, the agency reports to the court, usually in the form of a
published decision. 34 The trial before the court then proceeds and
includes further examination of the challenged conduct under the
antitrust laws. 35 By contrast, when antitrust immunity is invoked,
the challenged conduct is not examined by either the court or the
agency under any laws. Independent agency activity in the matter
may or may not be stirred.
Certain Supreme Court decisions in this area are often urged in
support of implied antitrust immunity although they actually ad-
dress only primary jurisdiction. The standards for a primary juris-
dictional reference were not, at the outset, clearly distinguished from
the standards for implied repeal. Over the years, with little direct
conflict,36 the Court has developed criteria for each and the stan-
dards are clearly separate. A review of the Supreme Court cases il-
lustrates the development of the now clearly distinct standards.
III. The Supreme Court Cases
The seminal case discussing implied repeal by reason of a sub-
sequent regulatory act is Texas & Pacfc Railway Co. v. Abilene Cot-
30. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963).
31. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932).
32. See generally K. DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 29; K. DAVIS, TRESTISE, supra note 29.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
34. See, e.g., Carterfone, 13 FCC 2d 420, reh'g denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968); AT&T
(Dataphone), 62 FCC 2d 774 (1977).
35. On occasion, application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has not resulted in sub-
sequent judicial determination. "[Tihe practical effect of applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction has sometimes been to preclude such enforcement [of antitrust policy] entirely if
the agency has the power to approve the challenged activities, see United States Nay. Co. v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S. Ct. 247, 76 L. Ed. 408. United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1963).
36. See notes 37-153 and accompanying text infra.
ton Oil Co. , 7 a case that did not concern the antitrust laws. Rather,
a shipper alleged that rates charged by a carrier were unreasonably
high.38 The Court reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Act was
enacted to prohibit and redress the wrongs perpetuated by unjust
discrimination and undue preferences.39 The means Congress chose
to accomplish these purposes was the establishment of reasonable
rates uniformly applied to all.' Thus, the Abilene Court concluded,
"There is not only a relation, but an indissoluble unity, between the
provision for the establishment and maintenance of rates until cor-
rected in accordance with the statute and the prohibition against
preferences and discrimination."4 The Court further concluded
that a shipper's suit, if successful, would allow the shipper to "re-
ceive a preference or discrimination not enjoyed by those against
whom the schedule of rates was continued to be enforced.
42
Abilene thus created a rule concerning suits by customers. Even
this rule, however, was based on a carrier's confficting duty under
another law. Repeal was therefore based on irreconcilability. At
this early juncture, there was no established distinction between pri-
mary jurisdiction and implied antitrust repeal.43 Extensive language
in the ratio decidendi of the Court could be understood to address
primary jurisdiction, not implied repeal."
It is commonly believed that implied repeal by reason of regula-
tion was not applied to antitrust law until 1922. Presumably, in Ke-
ogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 45 the Court inferred a
repeal of the Sherman Act. This is fiction. Keogh, like Abilene, was
an action brought by a shipper against a carrier for allegedly illegal
overcharges. In Keogh, the overcharges were allegedly the product
of a conspiracy to restrain trade.46 The sole issue was "whether there
is a cause of action under section 7 of the antitrust act."'47 The Court
initially noted a Commission finding that "all rates fixed were rea-
sonable and nondiscriminatory. ' 48 Nevertheless, the Court held,
37. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
38. Id at 430.
39. Id at 439.
40. The Court observed,
And it is apparent that the means by which these great purposes were to be accom-
plished was the placing upon all carriers [of] the positive duty to establish schedules
of reasonable rates which should have a uniform application to all, and which should
not be departed from so long as the established schedule remained unaltered in the
manner provided by law.
Id
41. Id at 440.
42. Id
43. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
44. See 204 U.S. at 440-41.
45. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
46. Id at 159-60.
47. Id at 161.
48. Id
"The fact that these [rates] had been approved by the Commission
would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the government." 9 Under
the statute, the Government could still seek redress by criminal pro-
ceedings,5° injunction,5 or forfeiture. 2 Thus, the Interstate Com-
merce Act Amendments could not have impliedly repealed sections 1
or 2 of the Sherman Act, as is commonly, though mistakenly,
believed.
Keogh did not address antitrust law generally. Rather, it ad-
dressed the private injury requirement of then section 7 of the Sher-
man Act, now section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Keogh Court's
rationale53 therefore does not require implied repeal of the antitrust
laws at all. The case simply held that a customer of a carrier is not
injured within the meaning of the private injury requirement of the
private antitrust suit by paying rates expressly approved as reason-
able and non-discriminatory by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC). Thus, Keogh is solely a judicial interpretation of the
private injury requirement. Recently, the Supreme Court has specif-
ically made this point.54
Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 55 is the
major source of doctrinal confusion in this area of antitrust law.
This case was impliedly overruled or, at the very least, limited to its
facts by Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,56 United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), 57 and Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co.5" Terminal Warehouse abandoned Keogh's
plain construction of the private injury requirement of section 7 of
the Sherman Act. Thus, Keogh is now simply "a warning of the
practical inconvenience" of allowing remedies under both the regu-
49. Id at 161-62 (emphasis added).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
53. Section 7 of the Antitrust Act gives a right of action to one who has been
injured in his business or property. Injury implies violation of a legal right. The
legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the pub-
lished tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all pur-
poses, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The rights as defined by the
tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier (citation
omitted). This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of
Congress-prevention of unjust discrimination--might be defeated. If a shipper
could recover under § 7 of the Antitrust Act for damages resulting from the exaction
of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recov-
ered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors.
It is no answer to say that each of these might bring a similar action under § 7.
Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless the highly improbable
happened and the several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief.
Compare Texas & Pacoic Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440."
260 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added).
54. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980).
55. 297 U.S. 500 (1936).
56. 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
57. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
58. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
latory act and the antitrust laws.59
Another confusing aspect of Terminal Warehouse is its interpre-
tation of United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship
Co. 60 as holding "that the plaintiff must seek redress by application
to the Shipping Board.' In United States Navigation, the United
States Navigation Company sought to enjoin an alleged conspiracy
under the Sherman Act. United States Navigation argued that
Cunard's joint exclusive patronage contracts, under which shippers
were required to ship exclusively with Cunard, were in violation of
the antitrust laws.62 The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
dismissal of the United States Navigation Company's complaint
principally on the ground that the matter was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States Shipping Board.63 The Terminal
Warehouse Court concluded, "Certain then it is that the antitrust
laws are inapplicable in all their apparent breadth to carriers by rail
or water."'  This holding is plainly not the law.65 The judicial
glosses placed on United States Navigation and Keogh by the Termi-
nal Warehouse Court have been authoritatively rejected, 66 and the
ratio decidendi of Terminal Warehouse has been thoroughly discred-
ited. For example, the Terminal Warehouse Court reasoned that
while the antitrust laws have provided for injunctive relief, "Even so,
the right to sue, however explicit on its face, was held to have been
partially superseded in respect of private suitors by adoption of the
Shipping Act, which as to transactions within its range gave the only
remedies available. ' 67 The Terminal Warehouse Court's reliance on
this mistaken understanding of United States Navigation is fatal to
its reasoning. Because Carnation and PNB are later expressions of
the Court, the earlier holding in Terminal Warehouse is pro tanto
overruled 68 and is simply an irrelevant piece of history.
Three years after Terminal Warehouse, the Supreme Court re-
59. 297 U.S. at 512.
60. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
61. 297 U.S. at 513.
62. 284 U.S. at 478-79.
63. Id It is unnecessary to discuss the rationale of this case in detail because the
Supreme Court has expressly stated that United States Navigation involves only primary juris-
diction as opposed to any implied repeal of antitrust laws. Carnation Co. v. Pacific West-
bound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1966). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the
Court pointed out "the practical effect of applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has
sometimes been to preclude such enforcement [of antitrust policy] entirely if the agency has the
power to approve the challenged activities, see United States Navigation, 284 U.S. 474, 52 S.
Ct. 247, 76 L. Ed. 408 .. " 374 U.S. at 353-54.
64. 297 U.S. at 514.
65. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945).
66. Carnation, 383 U.S. at 220-21; PNB, 374 U.S. at 354; United States v. RCA, 358 U.S.
334, 347-48 (1959).
67. 297 U.S. at 513.
68. See, e.g., Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 F.2d 962, 964
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945).
turned to the proper analysis of the implied repeal issue in United
States v. Borden Co. 69 The Supreme Court found erroneous a lower
court's ruling that "the existence of the authority vested in the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, although unexercised, wholly destroys the opera-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act with respect to the marketing of
agricultural commodities."70 This case does not discuss primary ju-
risdiction. Nor was there any discussion of the prior Abilene, Keogh,
United States Navigation, or Terminal Warehouse cases. Instead,
speaking solely in the language of implied repeal, the Supreme
Court set out a simple, straightforward, and entirely sound analysis.
The Court first noted that "repeals by implication are not fa-
vored. . . .When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule
is to give effect to both if possible."7 To overcome that rule, legisla-
tive intent to repeal "must be clear and manifest."72 To imply such
an intention, otherwise unexpressed, "There must be a positive re-
pugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the
old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro
tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."73 After noting the presence
of express antitrust immunities conferred when certain conditions
were fulfilled under the Act, the Borden Court held that the explicit
provisions of the Agricultural Act indicated the extent of any repeal
of the Sherman Act and that any further immunity would have been
clearly expressed by Congress in the Act itself.74
The doctrinal confusion indulged in Terminal Warehouse--es-
sentially a confusion between primary jurisdiction and exclusive ju-
risdiction, better described as implied repeal-was first expressly
limited in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. The Georgia Court
first entirely rejected the Terminal Warehouse treatment of Keogh.
Keogh was once again presented as a case concerning the private
injury requirement of Section 7 of the Sherman Act.75 The Georgia
Court then provided its own explanation of Terminal Warehouse by
quoting it for only a primary jurisdiction holding.76 Moreover, the
Georgia Court, after observing that Congress had not placed the
combination allegedly condemned by the Sherman Act under the
Commission, significantly stated, "Regulated industries are not per
se exempt from the Sherman Act."17 7 Directly contrary to the state-
69. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
70. Id at 197-98.
71. Id at 198.
72. Id
73. Id at 198-99 (quoting Justice Story in Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342, 362-63
(1842)).
74. 308 U.S. at 201. The focus on Congress' intent is one phase of sound analysis that
has been blurred in some lower court decisions.
75. 324 U.S. at 453.
76. Id at 455.
77. Id at 456.
ment by the Court in Terminal Warehouse that the antitrust laws
simply are not applicable to carriers by water or rail, the Georgia
Court emphatically held that "[tihese carriers [were] subject to the
antitrust laws."
78
Thus, the doctrinal confusion caused by Terminal Warehouse
was only momentary at the Supreme Court level. The Terminal
Warehouse analysis has not been indulged since. Terminal Ware-
house does not currently represent one of many conflicting states of
the law, but rather is a thoroughly rejected anachronism.
Following Georgia, the Supreme Court, in Far East Conference
v. United States,7 9 formulated a doctrine of primary jurisdiction
wholly distinct from any implied repeal doctrine.8 0 The Far East
Conference Court applied the common principle that in cases con-
cerning the exercise of administrative discretion, "agencies created
by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over."' This principle prevailed even when "the facts after they
have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise
for legal consequences to be judicially defined."82 The court rea-
soned that adherence to this principle correctly promoted uniformity
and consistency in businesses subjected to specialized agency con-
trol. The Supreme Court later emphasized, in Carnation Co. v. Pa-
eic Westbound Conference,83 that this principle is completely
different from the implied repeal doctrine.84
Finally, the Supreme Court had altogether distinguished pri-
mary jurisdiction from implied antitrust repeal. In United States v.
RCA, 85 the Court paid particular attention to this distinction, devot-
ing one section of its opinion to implied repeal,86 and a second en-
tirely separate section to primary jurisdiction.8 7 The organization of
this opinion foreshadowed the future state of the law and reflected
the Court's complete emergence from earlier confusions. This is evi-
denced in RCA's discussion of implied repeal, in which the Court
78. Id
79. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
80. A good deal of the spade work was done in General Amer. Tank Car Corp. v. El
Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 432-33, reh'g denied 309 U.S. 694 (1940). For a discus-
sion of primary jurisdiction as distinguished from implied repeal see notes 29-32 and accompa-
nying text supra.
81. 342 U.S. at 574-75.
82. Id.
83. 383 U.S. at 221 n.4.
84. This point was made clear in Far East's consideration of whether to stay or dismiss
the antitrust action: "Having concluded that initial submission to the Federal Maritime Board
is required, we may either order the case retained on the District Court docket pending the
Board's action ... or order dismissal of the proceeding brought in the District Court." 342
U.S. at 576-77.
85. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
86. Id at 339-46.
87. Id at 346-52.
plainly stated, "Whether these contentions [that the antitrust laws
have been impliedly repealed] are to prevail depends substantially
upon the extent to which Congress authorized the FCC to pass on
antitrust questions, and this in turn requires examination of the rele-
vant legislative history."88 A detailed examination of the legislative
history of the Act follows, from which the RCA Court concluded
that "the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Commission
was not given the power to decide antitrust issues as such, and that
Commission action was not intended to prevent enforcement of the
antitrust laws in federal courts."89 Furthermore, in the next sepa-
rately numbered section of the opinion, the Court significantly be-
gan, "We now reach the question whether, despite the legislative
history, the over-all regulatory scheme of the Act requires invocation
of a primary jurisdiction doctrine."90 The Court then concluded
that a primary jurisdictional reference was inappropriate.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States
(Panagra) ,91 the Court was confronted with a substantially different
regulatory statute. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 193892 created a full
panoply of government regulation. 93 Most importantly, the Civil
Aeronautics Board was charged with comprehensive obligations to
police competition in the airline industry.94 The Supreme Court
held that Congress had impliedly repealed the antitrust laws in the
context of this extensive regulatory scheme.
This case represented no fundamental change in the law. It was
the markedly different type of regulatory scheme that brought about
88. Id at 339.
89. Id at 346.
90. Id
91. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
92. 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
93. Pervasive regulation was compounded by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat.
731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)). Federal regulation of this
industry has been recently revamped. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
92 Stat. 1705.
94. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976 & Supp. 1979). The CAB was not to encourage unfair or
destructive competition. Id. § 1302(c). Competition was also a mandate, at least to the extent
that it assured the development of a sound system. Id § 1302(d).
The CAB had a complex and conflicting set of directives. It was to regulate air transport
to preserve its inherent advantages, promote a high degree of safety, foster sound economics,
improve relationships among the carriers, and coordinate those relationships. Id § 1302 (b).
The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient air carrier service accompanied the task
of maintaining reasonable charges without unjust discrimination. Id
Almost every aspect of the industry was subject to government control, including prices,
exit, entry, and routes. See id §§ 1301 1302, 1305-1308, 1324, 1341, 1371-1373, 1374, 1376,
1382, 1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482, 1490, 1504. The Act required carriers to file tariff schedules
with the CAB, allow public inspection of the filed tariffs, and to observe the tariffs as long as
they were effective. Id § 1373. Tariffs could be changed under the Act only on 30 day notice
unless the CAB permitted a more expeditious change. Id Tariff changes were primarily car-
rier-initiated. Id Route control was effected through restrictions on the certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the CAB. Id § 1371(e)(1).
Panagra's different result.95 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange96
and PNB97 were decided immediately after Panagra. These cases
clearly and emphatically rejected any enhanced notion of implied
repeal of the antitrust laws. The Silver Court first rejected a district
court holding that the antitrust laws apply because the "substantive
act of regulation engaged in here was outside the boundaries of the
public policy established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "98
The Court also rejected the court of appeal's conclusion that because
the Exchange could adopt rules to govern members' conduct vis-a-
vis non-members, particular application of the rules was outside the
ambit of the antitrust laws.99 Instead, the Court instructed, "the
proper approach to this case, in our view, is an analysis which recon-
ciles the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather
than holding one completely ousted."'" The Silver Court then
enunciated the following "guiding principle to reconciliation of the
two statutory schemes": "Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the fregulatory] Act work, and even then only to the
minimum extent necessary. "10 '1
With that maxim in mind, the Silver Court focused on the par-
ticular act of self-regulation before it and concluded that the particu-
lar act was unnecessary to make the statute work. 2 Implied
antitrust immunity was therefore denied' because the operation
and enforcement of both statutes were reconcilable.
In PNB, the Court rejected the claim that the Bank Merger Act
impliedly immunized approved mergers from antitrust challenge.
Of first importance is the explanation of Panagra set forth in PNB.
In Pan American, the Court held that because the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board had been given broad powers to enforce the competi-
tive standard clearly delineated by the Civil Aeronautics Act, and
to immunize a variety of transactions from the operation of the
antitrust laws, the Sherman Act could not be applied to facts com-
posing the precise ingredients of a case subject to the Board's
broad regulatory and remedial powers; in contrast, the banking
agencies have authority neither to enforce the antitrust laws
against mergers ... nor to grant immunity from those laws.'°4
The Court noted that no provisions in the Bank Merger Act corre-
sponded to those referred to in the Civil Aeronautics Act. Conse-
95. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
96. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
97. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
98. 373 U.S. at 357.
99. Id
100. Id (emphasis added).
101. Id (emphasis added).
102. Id at 361.
103. Id Implied immunity was sought solely on the ground of irreconcilability of the
antitrust and regulatory statutes.
104. 374 U.S. at 351.
quently, the Court concluded that "the range and scope of
administrative powers under the Bank Merger Act bear little resem-
blance to those involved in Panagra. "'05  It followed therefore that
Congress, in' passing the Bank Merger Act, did not intend to affect
the applicability of antitrust laws." Analysis of PNB reveals that
the Supreme Court examined both irreconcilability and legislative
intent to repeal to determine the implied repeal contention. A find-
ing of implied immunity was denied when neither irreconcilability
nor legislative intent could be established. 07
The next major development' in the law of implied repeal fol-
lowed the decisions in two cases under statutory schemes bearing
somewhat greater resemblance to the statutory scheme in Panagra.
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 109 and United States v.
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) "o are important
not so much for their holdings, but rather for language in each that
has been urged in favor of much broader antitrust immunities gener-
ally. Chief Judge Pence, in his second decision in IT&T v. GTE,"'
put the matter extraordinarily well when he vWrote,
What we have, then, after a review of most of the cases, is an
ocean of antitrust punctuated by isolated islands of implied immu-
nity. GTE claims, however, that the most recent of the relevant
Supreme Court pronouncements, Gordon and NASD, have
pushed up a whole continent of exemption and have sent the wa-
ters rolling. "
2
Neither Gordon nor NASD, however, represent such a sharp break
with the past. Both Gordon and NASD turned on affirmative show-
105. Id at 351-52.
106. Nor did Congress in passing the Bank Merger Act, embrace the view that federal
regulation of banking is so comprehensive that enforcement of the antitrust laws
would be either unnecesary, in light of the completeness of the regulatory structure,
or disruptive of that structure. On the contrary, the legislative history of the Act
seems clearly to refute any suggestion that applicability of the antitrust laws was tobe
affected.
Id at 352.
107. Also important is the fact that thereafter--and entirely separately--the Court also
rejected the applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. In that discussion, the Court
wrote the following simple and definitive statement that clarified the nature of primary juris-
diction: "Court jurisdiction is not thereby ousted, but only postponed." ld at 353.
108. Developments in the next decade essentially clarified prior law. Carnation, for exam-
ple, is significant mainly for its construction of prior decisions, particularly United States Navi-
gation and Far East Conference. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S: 363
(1973) actually involved the scope of express, not implied, immunities. Id at 368-77, 379, 382-
84, 388-89; see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) was a straightforward applica-
tion of the unarticulated no-irreconcilability, no-affirmative showing of legislative intention to
repeal analysis. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973) and
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973) clarified the now entirely separate
primary jurisdiction doctrine.
109. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
110. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
111. 449 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Hawaii 1978).
112. Id at 1166, 1167 (citations omitted).
ings of legislative intentions to repeal. These legislative intentions
were peculiar to the statutes involved. Thus, Gordon and NASD are
not "a whole [new] continent of exemption,""' 3 but only two more
islands.1 14
Because both Gordon and NASD have been so often urged in
support of far wider propositions-for which neither properly
stands-an analysis of these two cases in further detail is neces-
sary."I5 The plaintiff in Gordon alleged that sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act were violated by the system of fixed commission rates
utilized by the New York Stock Exchange for transactions of less
than $500,000.' 16 To determine whether Congress intended such a
claim to be barred by an implied repeal of the antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court looked to the legislative history of section 19(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.' 't In particular, the Court
noted and relied on the fact that in the hearings on the proposed bill,
Mr. Samuel Untermeyer testified that "the bill would provide the
federal supervisory commission with 'the right to prescribe uniform
rates of commission, [but] it does not otherwise authorize the Com-
mission to fix rates, which it seems to me it should do and would do
by striking out the word "uniform."' That would permit the Com-
mission to fix rates."'' 18
Congress apparently followed Mr. Untermeyer's suggestion be-
cause section 19(b) as enacted actually omits the word "uniform"
and expressly provides for the "fixing of reasonable rates of commis-
sion." The word "reasonable" was inserted in place of the stricken
"uniform." This was expressly noted and relied upon by the
Supreme Court.' 19 More importantly, section 19(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 is expressly concerned with and autho-
rizes the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to make "such
changes as are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors
or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or
to insure fair administration of such exchange. ... 12
113. Id
114. Interestingly enough, only one "island" now remains. The fixed commission scheme
that provoked Gordon is no longer authorized. A 1975 amendment to the securities laws pro-
hibits such rate-fixing subject to certain qualifications. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(I) (1976).
115. See, e.g., Comment, The Application ofAntitrust Law to Telecommunications, 69 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 497 (1981).
116. 422 U.S. at 661.
117. Id at 665-67.
118. Id at 665-66. The quoted testimony also states that "the commission charged should
be either fixed by some governmental authority or supervised by such authority." Id
119. Id at 666.
120. Id. (emphasis added). See also id at 685, in which the Court noted,
Not only was the SEC authorized to disapprove rules and practices concerning
commission rates, but the agency also was permitted to require alteration or supple-
mentation of the rules and practices when 'necessary or appropriate for the protection
of investors and to insure fair dealings in securities traded in upon such exchange.'
Unquestionably, this language substantially strengthens the
analogy to Panagra, 21 in which the Federal Aviation Act delegated
the responsibility for policing fair trade in the airlines industry to the
Civil Aeronautics Board. 22 Generally, however, there is no such
delegation in the regulatory statutes. In Gordon, the delegation of
regulatory administration of competition was expressed in the very
section of the act dealing with fixed commission rates. That, how-
ever, was not the end of the matter. The Gordon Court next ob-
served that section 19(b), seemingly permitting fixed commission
rates subject to disapproval by the SEC, was enacted seven years
after price-fixing had been flatly outlawed by the Supreme Court as
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 123 In this context the Court
held that legislative permission to fix rates under SEC regulation,
when consciously undertaken by Congress seven years after the
Supreme Court had unequivocally prohibited the practice, satisfied
the requirement of an affirmative showing of legislative intent for
implied repeal of the antitrust laws.
124
The Supreme Court followed a similar pattern of analysis in
NASD. The Court first considered the Government's challenge to
alleged vertical resale price maintenance 25 and, second, an alleged
horizontal combination to restrict secondary trading of such
shares. ' 26 The N4SD opinion begins with an examination of section
22(f) of the Investment Company Act, 127 which the Court describes
as authorizing "mutual funds to impose restrictions on negotiability
and transferability of their shares, provided they conform with the
fund's registration statement and do not contravene any rules or reg-
ulations the Commission may prescribe in the interests of the holders
of all of the outstanding securities."' 28 To determine Congress' in-
tent in enacting section 22(f), the Court expressly relied on an SEC
study that recommended enactment of the Investment Company
Act, 129 on testimony that the restrictions on secondary trading of
mutual funds should be a "matter of rules and regulations,"'' 30 and
on the contemporaneous construction of the statute finally endorsed
by an agency not only charged with the act's administration' 3' but
121. 371 U.S. 296. See National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S 378, 389
(1981).
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
123. 422 U.S. at 681-82.
124. Id at 691. Justices Stewart and Brennan concurred only on the ground that there
had been an affirmative showing of legislative intent to repeal. Id at 693.
125. Id at 720-30.
126. Id at 701, 731-35.
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-52 (1976).
128. 422 U.S. at 720, 721.
129. Id at 704, 722-25.
130. Id at 722 n.35.
131. Id at 725.
also largely responsible for its enactment. 32 All of these are tradi-
tional sources of congressional intent. 33 However, an affirmative
showing of a legislative intention to regulate is not, per se, a showing
of a legislative intention to repeal the antitrust laws.' 34  Conse-
quently, the Court's analysis did not stop with these sources. In-
stead, the Court noted that the practices which Congress sought to
permit as "matter[s] of rules and regulations,"'' 31 the antitrust laws
had already forbidden as per se violations.1 36 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had determined that limitations on competition
were necessary because of the unique problems of the mutual fund
industry. Congress therefore "vested in the SEC final authority to
determine whether and to what extent they should be tolerated 'in the
interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities' of mutual
funds." 13
The dissent in NASD took the position that both Gordon and
Panagra addressed statutes expressly directing regulatory agencies
to oversee the interplay of competitive forces; 38 by contrast, the dis-
sent found similar direction lacking in the Investment Company
Act. 139 In Panagra, for example, the direction to the Civil Aeronau-
tical Board was to investigate and bring to a halt "unfair or decep-
tive practices or unfair methods of competition."'" In Gordon, the
statute directed the agency to make "such changes as are necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair deal-
ing. .... "I4 In N4SD, however, to the extent that the Court con-
sidered a statutory direction to the agency to oversee competition, it
was only a directive to act "in the interests of the holders of all of the
outstanding securities."
1 42
NASD thus seems to have involved a far narrower direction to
the relevant agency, but the gap is not as wide as might at first ap-
pear. The Court twice referred to section 3(b) of the Maloney Act, 
t 4
which provides that no association can be registered as a national
132. Id at 722.
133. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969).
134. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
135. 422 U.S. at 729.
136. Id
137. Here, however, Congress has made ajudgment that these restrictions on competi-
tion might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual-fund industry, and
has invested in the SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent they
should be tolerated 'in the interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities' of
mutual funds. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f).
Id at 729 (emphasis added). Whether or not Congress had made such a judgment, the Court
unanimous in Gordon, now split five to four.
138. Id at 741-43.
139. Id
140. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976), quoted in Panagra, 371 U.S. at 302.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976), quoted in Gordon, 422 U.S. at 666.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1976), quoted in NASD, 422 U.S. at 721 n.33.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(b) (1976), noted in NASD, 422 U.S. at 700 n.6, 732.
securities association unless the association's internal rules are
designed "to remove impediments to and to perfect the mechanism
of afree and open market. . . ."'I This directive to the agency is
similar to that in Gordon, although it is not as broad as the directive
given to the Civil Aeronautics Board in Panagra. Notably, the Court
mentions section 3(b) in its discussion of the alleged horizontal com-
bination.'45 The statute therefore clearly cuts across the entire
gamut of the question presented.
14 6
In marked contrast are regulatory statutes based generally on
the Interstate Commerce Act. These regulatory schemes provide
that review of the acts of a regulated entity is discretionary with the
agency.' 47 Thus, NASD was decided in a regulatory context that is
fundamentally different from the ordinary situation. NASD empha-
sizes the necessity to consider the distinctions among regulatory stat-
utes, 1 1 as well as the distinction between repeal implied by reason of
irreconcilability and repeal implied by reason of affirmative show-
ings of legislative intentions to repeal.
Whether the Court in NASD properly found an affirmative
showing of legislative intent to repeal from the narrow directions of
section 22(f) of the Investment Company Act itself or from the stat-
ute taken together with section 3(b)(8) of the Maloney Act is a very
close question, evidenced by the Supreme Court's five-four split. It
is also clear, however, that neither Gordon nor NASD, despite some
overly broad language in each, actually "pushed up a whole [new]
continent of exemption."' 49 More precisely, each case turned on
specific legislative intentions and is simply another tiny island of im-
plied immunity in a vast ocean of antitrust liability. 50
Thus, two grounds-and only two grounds-will support an im-
plied repeal: the first is irreconcilability and the second is an affirm-
ative showing of legislative intent to repeal by implication. The
latter criterion has only been satisfied in cases in which the repealing
act contains a directive to the regulatory agency to police the inter-
play of competitive forces.' 5' The irreconcilability criterion requires,
at a minimum, that the statutes produce differing results. This find-
ing alone is not sufficient however. ' 52 Rather, to find "irreconcilabil-
144. 15 U.S.C. § 790-3(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
145. 422 U.S. at 732.
146. At the very least, the Maloney Act mandates SEC review of NASD rules "to remove
impediments to and to perfect the mechanism of a free and open market." 15 U.S.C. § 790-
3(b) (1976).
147. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling, 442 U.S. 444 (1979).
148. See notes 154-196 and accompanying text infra.
149. IT&T v. GT&E, 449 F. Supp. at 1166-67.
150. This characterization of Gordon and NASD seems to have been endorsed recently by
the Supreme Court. National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981).
151. See, e.g., Panagra, 371 U.S. at 296; Gordon, 422 U.S. at 659; NASD, 422 U.S. at 694.
152. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. at 155.
ity" there must be a determination that repeal of the antitrust laws is
necessary to make the regulatory act work.'53 This requires an ap-
preciation of the nature of the various regulatory acts.
IV. The Differing Nature of the Regulatory Schemes
No two regulatory statutes are identical. Few are even slightly
similar. For example, in section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act,'
154
Congress has given the Civil Aeronautics Board broad power to in-
vestigate and to bring to a halt "unfair practices and unfair methods
of competition."' 55 Because of this broad delegation of power over
competition in the airline industry, the Court in Panagra 156 held that
relief against division of territories, allocation of routes, and the con-
spiracy to monopolize alleged therein were matters exclusively for
the Board.'57 Section 411, however, is virtually unique.' 58
Even among statutes based in some general sense on the Inter-
state Commerce Act' 59 significant differences exist. 160  Statutes pro-
viding for regulation of rail common carriers, for instance, include
provisions giving the ICC virtual direct control over the day-to-day
management of railroads. 16 1 No similar managerial provisions ap-
ply to communications common carriers 162 or motor common carri-
153. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. at 357.
154. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
155. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
156. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
157. 371 U.S. at 312; accord PNB, 374 U.S. at 351.
158. For a brief discussion of the comprehensive regulation that was formerly found in the
airline industry, see notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 162-164 infra. See generally Interstate Commerce Act
(Revised), Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901
(1976)),
160. Compare The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976), amended by Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), which is discussed at
greater length at notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra, with the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 801-842 (1976), which is discussed in greater detail at note 164 infra, and the Federal Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 (1976).
161. The Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, 41 Stat. 456, put the ICC directly
into many phases of rail management. The ICC often appears to be a superboard of directors
for certain aspects of the national rail industry. See I THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF Busl-
NESS AND INDUSTRY 3 (B. Schwartz ed. 1973). The ICC is empowered to establish connections
and rates for rail and water transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 10503 (1976), and to authorize the
construction and operation of rail facilities, id. § 10901. It also controls the abandonment and
discontinuance of rail lines. Id. § 10703. The ICC has the power to prohibit rebates, id
§ 10704, establish reasonable rates, id, and establish through-rates, id § 10703. The ICC also
possesses the power to inquire into the daily management of the railroads and to substitute its
judgment. Id. § 10321. Thus, the ICC regulation of rail transportation was, in many in-
stances, direct management of the industry by regulators. See B. Schwartz, supra, at 5. Con-
gress has recently taken major steps to deregulate the industry with the Staggers Rail Act of
1980, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
162. The Communications Act of 1934 was the culmination of earlier attempts to regulate
telephone and telegraph common carriers and the radio. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1976)).
The first minimal regulation of the telecommunications industry occurred with the pas-
sage of the Mam-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, 36 Stat. 539. Telecommunications
carriers were then regulated as common carriers, but that regulation was not as extensive as the
ers; 16 3 nor do any similar managerial provisions exist in the Shipping
Act, t6 the Bank Merger Act,' 65 the Natural Gas Act, 166 or the Fed-
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which merely required railroads to publish and file just and
reasonable rates with the ICC. The Act also prohibited certain discriminations. See Interstate
Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 1-3, 6, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Tariffs were carrier-generated. The ICC
was limited to consumer protection and enforcing antidiscrimination policies. Although the
Mann-Eikins Act enlarged ICC jurisdiction over railroads, it did not subject wire common
carriers to the extensive ICC tariff procedures. The telecommunications industry was merely
subjected to the extant consumer protection scheme. Increased regulation of the rail industry
did not provide a coincident increase in the regulation of telecommunications. See Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 573 (1921) (all common carriers are subject to
antidiscrimination principles, but differences exist between the regulation of rail and telecom-
munication carriers).
The Transportation Act of 1920 substantially increased the regulation of rail common
carriers. Pub. L. No. 152, 41 Stat. 456. It made express provisions for pooling and other
anticompetitive activities that would have violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id at
§ 407. With the exception of one minor increase in ICC power to enforce its anti-rebate duty,
however, telecommunication regulation remained virtually unchanged. See id § 404.
The Willis-Graham Act addressed the problem of competing local exchanges that resulted
in waste and inconvenience as a consequence of the duplication of facilities. Pub. L. No. 15,
42 Stat. 27 (1921). The statute authorized the ICC to approve consolidations that were "of
advantage to the persons to whom service is to be rendered and in the public interest." Id
§ 27.
It appears that the Willis-Graham Act was enacted because of congressional misunder-
standing of the scope of earlier legislation. Congress believed that the Sherman and Clayton
Acts did apply to state action. Parker v. Brown, 31.7 U.S. 341 (1943) had yet to be decided.
Consequently, many of the floor debates prior to Parker indicate that sponsors thought the
Sherman Act would apply to consolidations compelled by state regulatory actions unless the
Act was repealed when those consolidations were perceived to be in the public interest. See,
e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 1985 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Graham). Thus, Congress first provided
that the ICC should evaluate the public interest from the federal viewpoint. Congress did not
leave the industry to state regulatory power but established a federal agency to determine that
public interest. If that agency determined the merger to be in the public interest, the consoli-
dation would be approved and there would be no antitrust enforcement. Moreover, after
Parker, whenever a state-compelled consolidation of a local operating company in the state's
public interest, the Willis-Graham Act was superfluous.
Thus, the telecommunication common carriers were subject to the consumer protection
and antidiscrimination aspects of the Interstate Commerce Act and exempt from antitrust
prosecution for certain local consolidations. The industry was otherwise subject to the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. See United States v. AT&T, 1 Decrees & Judgments in Civil
Federal Antitrust Cases 554 (D. Ore. 1914), modified, 1 Decrees & Judgments in Civil Federal
Antitrust Cases 659 (D. Ore. 1914); 1 Decrees & Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases
572 (D. Ore. 1918); 1 Decrees & Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 574 (D. Ore.
1922). •
While broadcasting is a regulated industry, it is regulated in a unique manner. The FCC
is authorized to license broadcasters, 47 U.C.C. §§ 301, 307 (1976), and prescribe services, id
§ 303 (b). It has the right to prescribe frequency bands, id § 303(c), station locations, id
§ 303(d), regulate interference, id § 303(c), and regulate network broadcasting, id § 303(i).
Thus, while the basis of much of the Act was earlier regulation under the ICC, the direct
managerial regulation of rail carriers by the ICC was never applied to broadcasting. The
broadcasting industry is subject to antitrust laws. See United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334
(1959).
163. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976).
164. Ocean shipping is regulated by the Shipping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 260, 39 Stat.
728. Like the telecommunications, power, and many other regulated industries, tariffs are ini-
tiated by carriers when they are filed with the reluctant agency, in this case the Federal Mari-
time Commission (FMC). Rebates and discriminatory rates are prohibited. 46 U.S.C. § 812
(1976). Dual rates are allowed for a carrier engaged in foreign commerce to give lower rates to
shippers who agree to give exclusive patronage to certain carriers or to a conference of carriers.
Discriminatory and unjust rates are prohibited. Id §§ 815-816. Thus, while the FMC may
reject rates if they are discriminatory or unjust, the power to change the tariffs resides prima-
eral Power Act. 16 7
When the government exercises direct managerial control, the
situation regarding antitrust immunity is markedly different. An an-
titrust action generally challenges a business' free exercise of its busi-
ness judgment. If the regulatory agency directs that business
judgment, 68 a business' freedom is restrained, and it might be unfair
to subject the agency-dictated business undertaking to an antitrust
challenge.' 69 Conversely, when the regulated entity freely exercises
its "business judgment as to the desirability of the [challenged con-
duct],"'1 71 then, as the Court concluded in RCA, "Like unregulated
concerns, they. . . make this judgment with the knowledge that the
challenged conduct might run afoul of the antitrust laws."'' As the
Court similarly advised in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 172
"[W]hen [the regulated entity's challenged conduct is] governed in
the first instance by business judgment and not by regulatory coer-
cion '73 antitrust immunity is then generally inappropriate.
This explains the Court's statement in FCC v. RCA 17 that "pol-
icy has shifted from one of prohibiting restraints on competition to
one of providing relief from the rigors of competition, as has been
true of railroads."1 75 Most significant in support of that comment is
the Court's citation, which reads as follows:
Compare, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166
U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 25, 43 L. Ed. 1007 and United States v. Joint
Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, with the Transportation Act of 1920,
41 Stat. 456, 480; Consolidation of Railroads, 63 I.C.C. 455.176
This citation is significant because it was the Transportation Act
of 1920 that gave the ICC its managerial control of rail common
carriers. Furthermore, Trans-Missouri Freight177 and Joint Traffic
Association ' 78 held that otherwise the antitrust laws apply even to
rail common carriers.
Decidedly different was the regulation of communications com-
rily with the carriers. Id. § 817. There is minimal regulation or interference with the business
judgment of the ocean carriers in this scheme.
165. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976).
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976), amended by Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976).
168. See B. Schwartz, supra note 161, at 3. See also notes 171-173 and accompanying text
mfra.
169. See generally Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-92 (1976).
170. United States v. RCA 358 U.S. 334, 350 (1959).
171. Id at 350-5 1.
172. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
173. Id at 374.
174. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
175. Id at 92.
176. Id
177. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
178. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
mon carriers, 79 motor common carriers, 80 'common carriers by
water,' 8 1 common carriers by air, ' 8 2 broadcasters, 183power, 184 and
other industries. 8 5 Typical to common carrier regulation was the
employment of tariffs. 86 There are two basic forms of tariffs-car-
rier-initiated and Commission-prescribed. Carrier-initiated tariffs
often become effective without Commission scrutiny or approval.
187
However, "A Commission-prescribed rate or practice must be fol-
lowed by the carrier. It becomes the lawful rate or practice. But
where the carrier initiates the rate or practice its unlawfulness remains
open, not only to a prospective finding but also to a retroactive one.
The essential difference between carrier-initiated and commis-
sion-prescribed tariffs is that a carrier-initiated tariff may be changed
whenever, after proper notice, the carrier desires to file a new carrier-
initiated tariff.189 A commission-prescribed tariff cannot be over-
come by a contrary carrier-initiated tariff. 90 Instead, a commission-
prescribed tariff must be followed until the previous public interest
determination is altered.' 9' Moreover, a commission-prescribed
tariff cannot be retroactively unlawful.' 92 This distinction between
179. See the Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1976)). For a brief analysis of the telecommunication regulation see note
162 supra
180. See note 163 supra.
181. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-923 (1976) (water common carriers) and 46 U.S.C. § 801-842
(1976) (ocean shipping). See also note 164 supra for a brief review of the ocean shipping
regulatory scheme.
182. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 162 supra.
184. See note 167 supra.
185. The Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 238 (1966) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976)).
186. It should be understood at the outset precisely what is--and what is not--included in
the term "tariff." No legislative or administrative determination necessarily precedes or ante-
cedes practices initiated by the carrier. Rather, under 46 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), for example,
carriers are required to "designate, file with the Commission and print and keep open for
public inspection schedules showing all charges. . . and showing the classifications, practices,
and regulations affecting such charges." These schedules are referred to as "tariffs." The prac-
tices thus published are referred to as "tariff practices." On proper notice, any carrier-initiated
tariff may be changed by a new carrier-initiated tariff describing some new practice. A tariff is
"carrier-initiated" when the carrier simply files a description of a practice. A tariff is "Com-
mission-prescribed" when the practice is ordered by the Commission as in the public interest.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).
187. FCC Amicus Brief at 20, United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976). In
a footnote, the FCC pointed out, "In a recent 12-month period [September 1974 through Au-
gust 1975], the Commission received 1,371 tariff filings totaling 11,491 pages. This does not
count the voluminous supporting papers filed with the tariffs. The Commission obviously
could investigate only a small percentage of these filings." Id at 20 n.23. This sort of difficulty
is very common.
188. In re Carterfone, 13 FCC 2d 420, 425, reh'g denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968) (emphasis
added).
189. 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 204(a) (1980). See also Strassburg, The Common Carrier &
Regulation, 28 FED. CoMMuN. BAR J. 113, 190 (1975).
190. E.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 387
(1932).
191. Id;In re Carterfone, 13 FCC 2d 420, 425; reh'g denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968).
192. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932).
carrier-initiated and commission-prescribed tariffs is important.
Commission-prescribed tariffs embody public interest determina-
tions; carrier-initiated tariffs embody the "carriers' independent
business judgement."193
Even rail common carrier regulation and managerial control
have never been considered sufficient, without more, to completely
oust application of the federal antitrust laws.1 94 The antitrust laws
embody fundamental national economic policies' 95 with which there
simply can be no inherent inconsistency. Any alleged inconsistency
must be so extreme that it amounts to irreconcilability 96 and it must
be concretely shown.
This brief review illustrates that the conduct of an entity under
the carrier-initiated tariffs under any of these statutes may be the
result of the business judgment of the regulated entity. Even when
the regulated entity's carrier-initiated tariff conduct is not disap-
proved under one of these regulatory statutes, it is nonetheless the
regulated entity that in fact and law determines whether to undertake
the conduct in the first instance and, once undertaken, whether to
continue the conduct.
V. The Issue In The Courts
The reconciliation of Supreme Court cases proposed above has
never been explicitly adopted by any court to accommodate regula-
tory and antitrust statutes. 197 Seven courts of appeals 98 and approx-
imately a dozen district courts' 99 have recently addressed the issue of
193. FCC Amicus Brief at 20, United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976).
194. Of course, when these direct managerial provisions are not involved the antitrust
laws still apply. E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Sunoco Energy
Development v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 1980-1 TRADE CAS. .(CCH) 63,196 (D. Wyo.
1980).
195. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966), modified
by 383 U.S. 932; see also National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89
(1981).
196. For a discussion of irreconcilability see notes 271-310 and accompanying text infra.
197. It seems that the court in Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d
1114 (3d Cir. 1979) actually used this approach. Judge Waddy in United States v. AT&T, 427
F. Supp. 57 (D.C. 1976) also seems to have employed this approach. United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), and National Gerimedical v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378
(1981) also appear to be based on this approach. Nevertheless, no court has expressly adopted
this rationale to accommodate antitrust and regulatory statutes.
198. Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981); Northeastern
Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir.
1980); Mid-Texas Communication Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980); Essential Communication Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir.
1979); Industrial Communications Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 505 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1974);
IT&T v. GT&E, 518 F.2d 912 (9th Cit. 1975).
199. Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T, 481 F. Supp. 120 (D.D.C. 1978); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
AT&T, 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978), afl'd, rev'd, and rem'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 76
(2d Ci. 1981); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Interconnect
Planning Corp. v. AT&T, 465 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. 11.), cert. denied No. 78-2457 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 1978); DASA
implied antitrust immunity for telephone companies. Almost as
many rationales exist for the decisions. For example, in Northeastern
Telephone Co. v. 4. T&T, 20 0 the Second Circuit described two nar-
rowly defined situations in which implied repeal of the antitrust laws
by a later regulatory statute would be permissible. One of those cir-
cumstances was "when the regulatory scheme is so pervasive that
Congress must be assumed to have forsworn the paradigm of compe-
tition. .. .0 In the Third Circuit, however, pervasiveness is not
an independent ground for implied repeal, but rather just one indi-
cation of congressional intent.2 °2
The Central District of California20 3 and the District of Ore-
gon204 recognized a four-factor test that has very little to do with
either congressional intent, irreconcilability, or pervasiveness, 20 5 and
the Ninth Circuit has held that the entire matter is solely one of con-
gressional intent.20 6 A similar five-factor test has been proposed20 7 ,
as well as an eight-factor test,20 8 and a three-factor test.20 9 The Dis-
trict of Columbia2 " and the Northern District of Illinois2 1' seem to
agree on the two circumstances in which implied repeal may be
proper,212 but they differ substantially on the proper analysis to be
Corp. v. GT&E, 1977-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,610 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd 664 F.2d 716 (9th
Cir. 1981); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Electronics Corp., 1978-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,960
(S.D. Fla. 1976, appeal dismissed, 568 F.22 1203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978);
United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977), aff'd
on rehearing, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978), mandamus deniedsub nom. In re AT&T, No.
78-761 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Chastain v. AT&T, 401 F.
Supp. 151 (D D.C. 1975); Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd,
664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981); IT&T v. GT&E, 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972), rev'don
other grounds, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), on remand, 449 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Hawaii 1978).
200. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
201. Id at 82.
202. Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1117 n.8 (3d Cir. 1979).
203. Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 664 F.2d 716 (9th
Cir. 1981),
204. Selectron, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., No. 76-965-BE (D. Ore. June 19,
1978), app.filed, No. 78-2529 (9th Cir. June 19, 1978).
205. The four factors considered by the Phonetele court were as follows: (1) Are the acts
charged the "precise ingredients" of the regulatory authority? (2) Can the regulatory agency
grant relief? (3) Is competition a component of the regulatory standard? (4) Does the regula-
tory agency have expertise to which the courts have deferred? 435 F. Supp. at 212-13.
There is nothing inherently unreasonable about the particular four factors chosen; they
are simply irrelevant to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the factor
approach to reading the cases is an inherent disaster. It is not sufficient to examine a case for
particular legal or factual elements and then compare the presence or absence of those ele-
ments with the results reached. What is omitted from such analysis is the heart of the case-
the ratio decidendi, the reasoning, the holding.
206. Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1981); Mt. Hood Stages v. Grey-
hound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 691 (1977), vacated and remanded, 437 U.S. 322 (1978).
207. See 85 YALE L.J. 254, supra note 5.
208. See 57 TEX. L. REV., supra note 5.
209. Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (Claiborne, J., dissenting).
210. United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1322-23 (D.C. 1978) [hereinafter referred
to as United States II].
211. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1082 (N.D. I11. 1978).
212. See notes 210-11 supra.
undertaken." 3 In short, as the Eighth Circuit justly complained,
"The statutory schemes of regulation, the implementation of those
schemes and the competitive situations have varied so greatly from
industry to industry that no clear path for determining whether im-
plied immunity exists has been illuminated."2 4 We write precisely
to light such a clear path to sound analysis.
VI. Proper Analysis of the Issues
The law of statutory construction mandates a straightforward
two-pronged analysis. The first question is whether an affirmative
showing of legislative intent to repeal can be made. If not, the ques-
tion is simply whether the statutes are irreconcilable-whether the
statutes produce differing results. If no affirmative intent to repeal
exists and the statutes do not produce differing results, implied re-
peal is simply impermissible.1 5
Two types of immunity claims have been presented and are dis-
tinguishable. One is a claim for blanket immunity. The other is a
claim for immunity regarding particular conduct.
A. Blanket Immunity
The claim of blanket immunity asserts that the requested immu-
nity should cover everything. Congress has never expressly ex-
empted an entire industry from the operation of the antitrust laws
and no court has ever implied such a broad-based immunity. When
Congress has granted express immunity, it typically has provided
that when certain steps are taken - usually the approval or failure
to disapprove by a regulatory agency - the antitrust laws do not
apply to the particular transaction approved or not disapproved.
z1 6
Claims of implied blanket immunity have been repeatedly
rejected.217
213. For example, while MCI seems to have turned on extensive legislative history, 462 F.
Supp. at 1087, this legislative history was entirely unmentioned in Jarvis. Altogether different
parts of the legislative history were relied on in United States II. Moreover, United States II
seems to have turned in part on the comparative weakness of the regulatory scheme under the
Communications Act as an indication of legislative intentions. 461 F. Supp. at 1326-27. Such
comparisons of pervasiveness versus weakness were also unmentioned in Jarvis and Northeast-
ern. Northeastern and MCI relied on comparisons of the statutes involved. Similar compari-
sons were generally omitted from Jarvis and even from United States II.
214. Sound, Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1980).
215. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); Morton v. Man-
cari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
216. See generally Federal Maritime Comm'n. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973);
Carnation, 383 U.S. at 216-17; Borden, 308 U.S. at 198-200.
217. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. at 357; MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1080-83 (1978); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 477 F.
Supp. 251, 254-55 (D. Conn. 1978).
B. Particular Immunities
The only immunity Congress has ever expressly granted and the
only immunity courts have ever implied is immunity for particu-
lar218 and discrete 21 9 transactions and occurrences. The rule in these
cases has been articulated as follows: "Repeal is to be regarded as
implied only if necessary to make the [regulatory scheme] work and
then only to the minimum extent necessary. '220  This principle is
plainly an axiom of the irreconcilability ground for implied repeal.
C. Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws in the Telephone Terminal
Equipment Context
Implied repeal is permissible in only two circumstances: an af-
firmative showing of legislative intent to repeal the antitrust laws; or
irreconcilability of regulatory statutes with antitrust laws.22'
L There Was No Legislative Intent To Impliedly Repeal
The Antitrust Laws In The Enactment of Telecommunications Regula-
tion. -The legislative history of statutes regulating the telecommuni-
cations industry does not contain any affirmative showing of
legislative intent to repeal the antitrust laws.222 Rather, the legisla-
tive history evidences a desire on the part of Congress to subject the
industry to the antitrust laws in all but the narrowest of regulator-
approved instances.223
In 1907, the Bell System was securely number one in the tele-
communications industry, but its formidable competitors had left it
financially weakened. 224  American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T), under the direction of its President, Theodore Vail, sought
regulation as a shield against further competition. In a 1908 Annual
Report, Vail wrote,
218. See Hughes Tool, 409 U.S. at 385 n.14. See also statutes cited supra note 17.
219. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. at 360-61.
220. Id
221. See cases collected at note 218 supra. Even this is a somewhat expansive reading.
See also Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). Anything more is wholly
unwarranted.
222. See note 162 supra and notes 223-270 and accompanying text infra. Compare
Gordon, notes 109-124 and accompanying text supra with N4SD, notes 125-149 and accompa-
nying text supra and Hughes Tool, notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
223. Specific exemption is found if the FCC approves the merger of telecommunication
carriers. 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c) (1970).
224. In 1907, according to the Census Bureau report, the Bell System had 3,132,000
telephones in service. Independents serviced approximately 2,987,000 exclusive of
farmer mutual systems. More competitive Bell policies, the failure of many in-
dependents, and the purchase of others by AT&T reversed the situation of a few
years earlier and restored Bell's numerical lead. But the battle was far from over and
the interim winner was a company in extremis. Financially, the battle had left Bell
hanging on the ropes. Frequently poor service and heavy-handed competitive tactics
resulted in a terrible public image.
See J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 127 (1976).
It is contended that if there is to be no competition, there should
be public control. It is not believed that there is any serious objec-
tion to such [public] control [by regulation], provided it is in-
dependent, intelligent, considerate, thorough and just,
recognizing, as does the Interstate Commerce Commission in its
report recently issued, that capital is entitled to its fair return and
good management or enterprise to its reward.22 5
Clearly, Vail wanted AT&T to be protected from competition under
regulation.
226
Although regulation of communications common carriers was
forthcoming with the Mann-Elkins Act of 19 10,227 there was no con-
comitant "state protection from aggressive competition," which
AT&T sought as a corollary to the regulation to which it had "no
serious objection." In 1913, a federal appellate court applied the an-
titrust laws to an AT&T subsidiary228 and in July 1913 the Depart-
ment of Justice Antitrust Division filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon.229 The suit sought to set
aside certain mergers as violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
231
These suits were settled by letter from N. C. Kingsbury, Vice Presi-
dent of AT&T, to Attorney General J. C. McReynolds23 I and by
subsequent consent decree.232 This agreement, called the Kingsbury
Commitment, acknowledged AT&T's duty at the time to abide by
the antitrust laws. In particular, AT&T promised (1) to dispose of its
stock holdings in Western Union, (2) to forego further mergers un-
less the Department of Justice and the ICC approved, and (3) to al-
low other telephone companies to interconnect with the Bell
System.233
The tariff procedures were originally developed in the Interstate
Commerce Act to deter discrimination by railroads. These proce-
dures, primarily for filing and publication of rates, were settled by
the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.234 While Congress simultaneously ad-
225. T. VAIL, VIEWS ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS 8 (1917). See also Federal Communications
Commission, Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States, H. Doc. No. 340,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 133 (1939).
226. In his 1910 Annual Report, Vail wrote, "We believe that if there is to be [public]
control, there should be protection." T. VAIL, supra note 225, at 33. To the same effect is the
more elaborate statement of the position set forth in the 1911 Annual Report: "If there is to be
state control or regulation, there should also be state protection-protection to a corporation
striving to serve the whole community (some part of whose service must necessarily be unprof-
itable), from aggressive competition which covers only that part which is profitable." Id at 43.
227. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45.
228. United States Tel. Co. v. Central Union Tel. Co., 202 F. 66 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
229 U.S. 620 (1913).
229. 1913 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 16.
230. Id
231. Letter from N.C. Kingsbury, Vice-President of AT&T, to Attorney General J.C. Mc-
Reynolds (Dec. 19, 1913) (hereinafter cited as Kingsbury Commitment].
232. United States v. AT&T, I Decrees & Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases 483 (D.
Ore. 1914).
233. Kingsbury Commitment, supra note 231.
234. The original Interstate Commerce Act established the requirement that rates be just
ded telephone and telegraph companies to the definition of common
carriers in the Interstate Commerce Act, 235 the tariff procedures were
not applicable to communications companies236 until the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 took effect. 237 In the interim, communications
common carriers had a duty to establish just and reasonable charges
and to avoid unjust and unreasonable charges. 238 These charges did
not have to be filed nor be of public record. By contrast, that is
precisely what the Mann-Elkins Act required of rail common
239carriers.
In 1914, section 11 of the Clayton Act authorized the ICC to
enforce certain substantive prohibitions of the Clayton Act.24  As
one contemporaneous authority has pointed out, this reflected Con-
gress' intent to "continue the subjection of the railroads to the anti-
trust laws,"' 24 ' a subjection the Supreme Court had reaffirmed two
years earlier.242 The Third Circuit noted in Essential Communica-
tions Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 24 3 "A fortiori the less regulated tele-
communications companies were not exempt."
2 44
The Transportation Act of 1920245 "substantially increased the
already pervasive regulation of the railroad industry by the ICC."
24 6
The Transportation Act also represented a fundamental change in
policy away from competition and toward cooperation in the rail in-
dustry.247 To this end the Transportation Act of 1920 injected the
ICC into the daily management of the railroads with direct regula-
and reasonable. It prohibited preferential and discriminatory rates, required carriers to inter-
connect, and established basic tariff procedures. Rates were to be published and filed with the
Commission. They could not be increased except after ten days notice. No notice was re-
quired for rate reductions. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 24 Stat. 379, 379-81
(1887). See SHARFMAN, I THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 21-22 (1931). The El-
kins Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 847, provided incentive to comply with the tariff provisions by estab-
lishing the tariff rates as the standard of lawfulness and making noncompliance a
misdemeanor for which the corporation itself was liable. See I. SARiFMAiN, supra, at 35-37.
The Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) generally expanded the ICC's jurisdiction, required
carriers to file their tariffs on 30 days' notice, and authorized the ICC to prescribe maximum
rates for the future. See I. SHARFMAN, supra, at 42-46. Finally, the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,
365 Stat. 539, authorized the ICC to suspend rates prior to their effective date.
235. 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
236. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921); Essential
Communications Sys., Inc. v AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir. 1979).
237. Communications Act of 1934, § 201, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). See also Mann-Elkins Act,
36 Stat. at 548.
238. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, § 7, 36 Stat. at 539.
239. 36 Stat. at 548. Compare Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 6, 24 Stat. 379, 380-82
(1887), as amended by, Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 103, 547, 32 Stat. 847 (1903); Hepburn Act,
Pub. L. No. 337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co.,
256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921).
240. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
241. I. SHARFMAN, supra note 234, at 113.
242. United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
243. 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979).
244. Id at 1118.
245. 41 Stat. 456.
246. Essential, 610 F.2d at 1118.
247. FCC v. RCA, 346 U.S. 86-92 (1953).
tory authority over managerial policies and operating details.2 4 8
None of these managerial provisions were applicable to communica-
tions common carriers. Instead, the Transportation Act "left the
control of wire systems practically as it was under the Interstate
Commerce Act, prior to federal [wartime] control.
24 9
Nor did the enactment of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921250 al-
ter the nature of communications common carrier regulation. The
Willis-Graham Act permitted mergers of operating telephone com-
panies found to be in the public interest by the ICC. This was a very
narrow provision 25' and effected no change in the nature of federal
regulation of telecommunications common carriers. In fact, it sim-
ply modified and codified the procedure already in place under the
Kingsbury Commitment.
The Communications Act of 1934 did change the nature of fed-
eral regulation of communications common carriers, but not in the
fashion in which the Transportation Act changed the nature of fed-
eral regulation of rail common carriers. Rather, the Communica-
tions Act was to prior regulation of communications more what the
Mann-Elkins Act was to prior regulation of railroads. For example,
the Mann-Elkins Act required rail common carriers to establish
through routes with other common carriers.252 The concomitant ob-
ligation to interconnect in the communications industry was first im-
posed by regulatory law253  with the enactment of the
Communications Act.254 Simiarly, the duty to announce rates and
practices through filed tariffs, imposed in virtually final form by the
Mann-Elkins Act on rail common carriers,255 was first imposed by
248. See I. SHARFMAN, supra note 234, at 236. See also B. Schwartz, supra note 161, at 3.
249. H. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1919); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 650,
6th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1920); accord 610 F.2d at 1118. The only modification was a minor
increase in the ICC's enforcement powers with respect to the anti-rebate provision. See Trans-
portation Act, Pub. L. No. 152, § 401, 41 Stat. 474, 479 (1920).
250. 42 Stat. 27.
251. It should be noted that the only affirmative showing of any legislative intent to repeal
the antitrust laws is in the history of the Willis-Graham Act in the 67th Congress. Since the
Willis-Graham Act expressly repealed the antitrust laws "under proper circumstances," H.
REP. No. 109, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 2 (1921), one would expect some expressions of congres-
sional intent to attain that end. But a broader exemption from the antitrust laws was not
intended. Representative Huddleston opposed the use of the antitrust laws against all monop-
olies, whether in communications, meat packing, steel, oil, or otherwise. 61 CONG. REc. 1989
(1921) (remarks of Rep. Huddleston). These views were not enacted into law. Moreover, as
the Court noted in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976), "Remarks of this
kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearing other than by persons responsible for
the preparation or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight." Id at 203 n.24 (citations
omitted).
252. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218 §§ 1, 4, 36 Stat. 539, 544-48 (1910).
253. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 201, 48 Stat. 1064. As of 1913,
AT&T had a duty to interconnect under the Kingsbury Commitment. See text accompanying
note 231 supra.
254. 610 F.2d at 1119.
255. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 548 (1910).
the Communications Act on communications common carriers.256
While the FCC may have been given some increments of au-
thority beyond those possessed by the ICC over rail common carriers
prior to the Transportation Act of 1920, any changes appear to have
been virtually de minimis. 257 Most importantly, aside from a short-
ened version of the ICC's authority to regulate capital expenditures
of rail common carriers, the Communications Act of 1924 enacted
none of the managerial powers that the ICC had been given over rail
common carriers in the Transportation Act of 1920.258 As the court
in Essential clearly articulated, "The [Communications] Act [of
1934] does not impose on the telecommunications industry the kind
of comprehensive regulation which, after 1920, the ICC exercised
over the railroads.
25 9
Moreover, congressional intent in the enactment of the Commu-
nications Act seems to have been to affirmatively continue the appli-
cation of antitrust laws to the telecommunications industry. The
question of implied repeal arose in the consideration of whether tele-
graph common carriers also enjoyed immunity for mergers under the
repeal and re-enactment of the Graham Act.26° Senator Dill, who
sponsored the bill that became the Communications Act, replied to
the Senate, "No, I should think not. There is no special statute per-
mitting it and therefore the antitrust statute probably would ap-
ply."'26 ' Dill's response was not idle dictum. Postal Telegraph
256. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 201, 48 Stat. at 1064. As the court
in Essential stated, "Many provisions of the 1934 Act were carried forward almost verbatim
from the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910." 610 F.2d at 1119.
257. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921). The com-
mittee reported that the new law "left the control of the wire systems practically as it was
under the Interstate Commerce Act prior to [war-time] federal control." H. REP. No. 456, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1919); H. REp. No. 650, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 61 (1920). The strengthened
authority was insubstantial since it only affected the enforcement powers with respect to the
anti-rebate provision. See Mann-Elkins Act, § 2, 36 Stat. 539. 544-48, as amended by the
Transportation Act, § 404, 41 Stat. 474, 479 (1920). This was but an elaboration of the duty to
provide service on a just and reasonable basis, without unjust discrimination or undue prefer-
ence. See Sections I and 15, as amended by 36 Stat. at 544-46, 551-54. Because neither the
policies nor the provisions of the Transportation Act applied to communications companies,
Congress provided limited relief from the antitrust laws for certain local exchange consolida-
tions. See Willis-Graham Act, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 221 (1976)): This
relief probably was not necessary under existing law. See note 243 supra.
258. Compare Interstate Commerce Act, §§ 18-22, as amended by, 41 Stat. 474, 477-78
(1920), with the Communications Act, § 214, 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
259. 610 F.2d at 1120. In addition, the railroads were still subject to antitrust laws after
1920. See note 194 supra See also Keogh v. Chicaqo & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 161-62
(1922).
260. The issue was whether § 221(a) of the Communications Act, which permitted certain
telephone mergers, also applied to telegraph companies.
261. 78 CONG. REC. 8823 (1934) (emphasis added). This emphasis is actually first sup-
plied by the Senator himself. In introducing the bill that became the Federal Communications
Act, Senator Dill reported to Congress,
These gentlemen [two ICC examiners, a Radio Commission representative, acting
chief counsel for the State Department handling communications and the legislative
counsel for the Senate] went over the bill, not once, but again and again, line by line, to
Company and Western Union wanted to merge in 1937, 1938, 1939,
1940, 1941, and 1942. Nevertheless, though regulated under the
same title of the same statute, those telegraph common carriers did
not dare to merge until 1943 when Congress enacted section 222(c)
of the Communications Act.262 Nor is the legislative history of that
statute silent. The House of Representatives reported to the Senate
after considering the bill that became section 222(c), "This affirma-
tive grant of authority to merge is required because of the fact that
the antitrust laws now stand in the way of such consolidations and
mergers. "263
Sections 221 (a) and 222(c) vividly demonstrate, in the context of
the telecommunications industry, Congress' ability and willingness
to displace the antitrust laws in a clear and unambiguous manner
when that result is desired. Congress' intent was formally expressed
in the Communications Act: "Nothing in this chapter contained
shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addi-
tion to such remedies."2 " Other legislative history of the
Communications Act confirms this conclusion.265
see that it covered sofar as possible all the existing law that is in the statutes which we
are proposing to repeal, and also to see that it did not seriously conflict.
Id at 8822. It seems unlikely that such fundamental national policies as those embodied in the
antitrust laws were overlooked.
Section 602 of the Communications Act was entitled "Repeals and Amendments," 78
CONG. REC. 10,984 (1934), and included an express amendment to § I 1 of the Clayton Act,
giving the FCC jurisdiction to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act. Id This jurisdic-
tion is not exclusive. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); IT&T v. GT&E, 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1165 (D.
Haw. 1972), afl'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975). Section 11 (e) of the Clayton Act ex-
pressly provides, "No order of the Commission or board or the judgment of the court to en-
force the same shall in any wise relieve or absolve any person from any liability under the
antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 21(e) (1976). This is the only express amendment of the antitrust
laws to be found in the Communications Act and the only express immunity for telephone
companies to be found is in § 221(a). This provision is inapposite, but the debate is highly
pertinent.
262. 47 U.S.C. §222(c) (1976). This section authorizes the FCC to approve mergers of
telegraph operating companies. Once so approved, such mergers are expressly immune from
antitrust challenge.
263. H.R. REP. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943) (emphasis added).
264. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1976). To the same effect is id § 407 under which the FCC shares
jurisdiction to enforce tariff violations with federal district courts.
265. While considering § 215 of the original Senate Bill, Congress was very concerned
with monopolistic exploitation by the Bell System. Senator Dill reported,
Charges have been made, and they have been quite free and quite broad, that there is
a tremendous spread of profit between the cost to Western Electric of manufacturing
the equipment and the prices paid by the operating companies which buy the equip-
ment from Western Electric, the result being not only that there is an enormous profit
on the operating equipment but the investment becomes part of the rate base in the
various states, upon which the subscribers must pay a sufficient amount to give a
return of a reasonable percentage.
78 CONG. REC. 8824 (1934). In its original form, § 215 did regulate contracts between regu-
lated parents and non-regulated subsidiaries, so-called "interservice contracts." AT&T op-
posed such regulation as an interference with its "free business judgment." Hearings on S.
2910, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (Sen. Committee on Interstate Commerce) (testimony of Mr.
In proceedings following the United States v. Western Electric
Co. consent decree,266 Congress once again explicitly indicated that
the Communications Act did not deprive federal courts of antitrust
jurisdiction over the telecommunications industry. After entry of
that consent decree, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary held hearings on the decree itself and on the
circumstances surrounding it.267 At no point was there a suggestion
that the Court lacked jurisdiction. On the contrary, the many criti-
cisms of the settlement procedure clearly demonstrated Congress'
view that the case should have been more vigorously pursued. 268
Furthermore, a subsequent report26 9 urged that the Department of
Gifford, President of AT&T). As enacted, this provision only authorized the FCC to study the
industry. 47 U.S.C. § 215 (1976). See also 78 CONG. REC. at 8824.
Accordingly, the FCC undertook a study of the telephone industry. The report observed,
"Supervision over the cost of manufacture of telephone apparatus and equipment is essential
to achieve adequate regulation of the Bell System." Federal Communications Commission,
Telephone Investigation 699 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Walker Report). The Walker Report
observed that there were two methods of regulating or controlling prices of telephone
apparatus:
First, the establishment ofcompetition among telephone manufacturers on those items
or classes of product which independent telephone manufacturers are able to produce
for the use of the Bell System Companies; and second regulation of the Western Elec-
tric Co. as apublic utility, with provision for determination of its valid and reasonable
manufacturing costs, including a fair profit, and the concurrent regulation of the rates
of operating telephone companies on the basis of such reasonable costs of Western
Electric's products existing in their properties.
Walker Report, supra, at 700 (emphasis added). Commissioner Walker then considered both
competition and regulation and concluded, "[lt is recommended that the Communications
Act of 1934 be amended so as to permit regulation of the Western Electric Co. by the Federal
Communications Commission as a public utility in the manner above described." Walker
Report, supra, at 702 (emphasis added).
The final report substantially adopted the Walker Report but did not request regulatory
authority over Western Electric as a public utility. Focusing instead on what Commissioner
Walker had referred to as the "supervision over the cost of manufacture of telephone appara-
tus," Walker Report, supra, at 699, the final report reasoned in language almost identical to
that of Walker Report, setting out the twin alternatives of regulation or competition. See In Yes-
tigation ofthe Telephone Industry in the United States, supra note 225, at 587. The final report
concluded, "[it is at this time deemed necessary and desirable to recommend the following
amendment to the [Communications Act]: First, specfically to authorize this Commission to
prescribe basic cost-accounting methods to befollo wed by manufacturing companies subsidiary to
or affiliated with operating telephone companies through corporate structure." Id at 601 (empha-
sis added).
Congress refused even this limited regulation over the telephone equipment sector of the
economy. With the twin alternatives of competition and regulation laid before it by the FCC
in a statutorily-ordered investigation, clearly Congress, by its silence, chose competition as the
rule of trade for this sector of the economy.
These cost-accounting practices were later imposed on Western Electric, but not by ad-
ministrative or legislative determination. Rather, cost-accounting measures were agreed to in
order to settle antitrust litigation brought by the United States. United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 1956 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 68,246, at 71,139 (D.N.J. 1956).
266. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
267. Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice, Hearings before the Antitrust
Subcommittee ofthe House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-120 (1958).
268. Id
269. Report ofthe Antitrust Subcommittee ofthe House Committee on the Judiciary on the
Consent Decree Program ofthe Dept. ofJustice, H. REP. No. 27, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 120
(1959).
Justice investigate and take prompt enforcement action against any
violation of the consent decree.
Thus, from 1910 to 1959270 unbroken legislative history reveals
a complete absence of congressional intent to impliedly displace the
antitrust laws in the telecommunications industry. The Mann-Elkins
Act left telecommunications common carriers outside of the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Commerce Court. The Willis-Graham Act
assumed the general applicability of the antitrust laws and carved a
narrow exemption therefrom to ameliorate only the merger prohibi-
tions. The Communications Act assumed that a special statute was
required to repeal the antitrust laws, and the one enacted was very
narrow. Congress has exhibited a consistent and demonstrated in-
tent to affirmatively apply the antitrust laws ever since.
2. The Statutes Are Reconcilable. -Since affirmative legislative
intent to repeal the antitrust laws is clearly lacking, the issue must be
resolved by analyzing whether the Communications Act of 1934 is
irreconcilable with antitrust enforcement. When considering
whether statutes are irreconcilable, "[i]t is not enough to show that
the two statutes produce differing results when applied to the same
factual situations, for that no more than states the problem.
' 27'
By private contract as early as 1899,272 the Bell System forbade
the connection or attachment of anything that was not Bell-supplied
to anything that was Bell-supplied. Later, this private contract pro-
vision was included by telephone companies in tariffs2 7 3 and became
known as the "foreign attachment tariff. '27 4 These were clearly car-
ier-initiated tariffs.
270. See H.R. J. RES. No. 285, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), providing that competition is
reaffirmed as the best means of serving American consumers' telecommunications needs.
271. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. at 164. Even the dissent, which would
have found an implied repeal, distinguished the case from those involving statutory schemes
that are the subject of this article. Justice Stevens noted, "Thus, if Congress intended to...
limit the coverage of a statute as important as the Sherman Act, a court would require an
unambiguous expression of intent to make such a change .. ." Id at 164.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that courts have a duty to harmonize and reconcile
statutes when a conflict arises. Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980). They are
not at liberty to choose which act is to be rendered ineffective. Id at 618. In the absence of
clearly expressed congressional intent, each statute should be regarded as effective. Id Clearly
when the conflict arises with an antitrust statute, unless there is an unambigious showing of
congressional intent, the antitrust statute must be given effect, if possible.
272. This history is reported in Hush-A-Phone, 20 FCC 391, 413 (1955).
273. See note 186 supra.
274. This tariff is reprinted in the initial consideration of interconnection of answering
devices in In re Jordaphone Corp., 18 PCC 644, 647 (1954); see also In re Carterfone, 13 FCC
2d 420, 421, reh'g denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968). Despite inroads on this restriction recounted
hereinafter, "such forbidden attachments included plastic covers on phone books (as late as
1975, such a case was taken by the telephone companies to the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina which overturned a prior state P.U.C. ruling that such a tariff restriction was valid), shoul-
der rests attached to the receiver, and dial locks to prevent people from calling out from a
telephone." Economic Implications of Customer Interconnection, 61 FCC 2d 766, 780 n.3
(1976).
The Bell System's post-Carterfone tariffs actually originated
prior to the July 28, 1968 Carterfone decision.275  On August 29,
1968, AT&T sent proposed tariff revisions to the FCC with a request
for "permission to file."'27 6 On September 11, 1968, the FCC dis-
missed the application for permission to file as mooted by the denial
of reconsideration in Carter/one, and stated that "AT&T may file
such tariff material, consistent with the Commission's decision in
those [Carter/one] dockets as it wishes without further Commission
order. 2 77 On September 13, 1968, AT&T submitted revised tariffs
without Commission permission, order, or invitation.278 The carrier-
initiated character of these tariffs is evidenced by the FCC's state-
ment allowing them to take effect: "Thus, we will permit the tariffs
to become effective as scheduled with the understanding that in do-
ing so we are not giving any specific approval to the revised tarffs "279
In its concluding consideration of the post-Carterfone tariffs, the
Commission expressly instructed, "Our action is not to be construed
as approval of the post-Carter/one tariffs and they remain subject to
such further action as the Commission may wish to take with respect
thereto. 28 o
Significantly, one year later the Commission emphatically re-
peated that its actions were not to be considered approval of the tar-
iffs.2s l It is clear that the FCC never intended to formulate a
registration program. Furthermore, the Commission's actions
clearly express its intention to give priority to the policy of ensuring
non-restrictive interconnection rather than protecting telephone
companies from undemonstrated harm. In fact, the connecting ar-
rangement was never consistently required.
The FCC in Carterfone unquestionably put first the policy of
not restricting interconnection, ahead of undemonstrated claims of
harm to the network. Restrictions on interconnection were to be per-
mitted only after harm to the network had been demonstrated with
respect to an item or class of customer-provided equipment.28 2 The
275. See Letter from Ben S. Gilmer, President of AT&T, to Rosel Hyde, Chairman, FCC
(July 29, 1968).
276. Letter to D. Emerson, Vice-President of AT&T, to Ben F. Waple, Secretary, FCC.
No such permission is ordinarily sought or required. See generally MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. F.C.C., 651 F.2d 365, 374-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1049 (1978);
AT&T v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865, 876-81 (2d Cir. 1973).
277. FCC Order 68-925 (Sept. 11, 1968).
278. Transmittal Letter No. 103-240, dated September 13, 1968, from W.N. Albert, Ad-
ministrator of Rates and Tariffs, AT&T, to the Secretary of the FCC clearly states that AT&T
filed revised tariffs wholly without Commission involvement.
279. Foreign Attachment Tariff Revisions, 15 FCC 305, 610 (1968) (emphasis added).
280. Id at 611.
281. Foreign Attachment Tariff Revisions, 18 FCC 871, 874 (1969).
282. The Carterfone Decision placed the burden of proof squarely upon the carri-
ers-not the users or this Commission--to demonstrate that a particular unit or class
of customer-provided equipment would cause either technical or economic harm to
information accompanying Bell's post-Carterfone tariffs failed to
show that any device would cause harm unless interconnected
through a carrier-supplied connecting arrangement.283 The FCC
later noted that Bell did not even argue "that this protection [the
connecting-arrangement tariff proposal] was the minimum protec-
tion required or the most cost effective.-
284
The connecting-arrangement tariff clearly never effectuated
Commission policy. 285 Bell's so-called "tariff" cannot realistically be
considered separately from Bell's enforcement and implementation
of that tariff. Bell's activities allegedly included intentional and un-
reasonable delay in the provision of connecting arrangements, provi-
sion of only defective connecting arrangements, improper
installation of connecting arrangements provided, and, finally, re-
fusal to provide effective repair service.286 Surely the FCC never ap-
proved these activities in any sense.
287
Furthermore, the connecting arrangement requirement was not
"an interim means of protecting the network. ' 288 If customer-pro-
vided equipment was a danger to the network, it was equally threat-
ening when provided by private-line subscribers or by subscribers of
independent telephone companies. Nonetheless, the Bell System did
not apply the connecting arrangement tariff to private-line customers
until five years after Carterfone and has never applied the connecting
arrangement requirement to subscribers of independent telephone
companies. The FCC has noted that there has been no harm to the
network from these inconsistencies in AT&T's policy.
289
Moreover, the Commission never intended to formulate its own
registration program. Rather, as Chairman Wiley stated for himself
and four other commissioners in the Memorandum and Opinion in
Interstate & Foreign MTS & WA TS,29 0 The "necessity of a terminal
the telephone network. . .; this burden was to be met prior to the filing of a tariff
restricting the use of such equipment.
Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 56 FCC 2d 593, 596 (1975).
283. Id
284. Id
285. The FCC declared these practices unlawful. Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 56
FCC 2d 593 (1975).
286. See, e.g., Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1256 (3d Cir. 1974); Plaintiffs
Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories in United States v. AT&T, C.A. No. 74-
1968 (D.D.C.) at 42, 43, 73, 76, 77, 78-82, 84, 87, 88, 92-94, 114, 150, 212, 219, 223, 240, 287,
289-291, 294. See also Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 1981);
Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel, 664 F.2d 716, 721 nn. 5-6 (9th Cir. 1981). This activity
occurred during one of Bell's worst periods. Recently, the situation has substantially improved
due to changes in top management.
287. See United States v. AT&T, 1978-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,551-75,532. None of
this conduct was ever described in any tariff or filing.
288. Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 446 F. Supp. 1090, 1102 (D.N.J.
1978), rev'd, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979).
289. Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 56 FCC 2d 593, 598 (1975).
290. 57 FCC 2d 1216 (1976).
interconnection program under FCC auspices is directly attributable
to the carrier's failure to develop standards and procedures which
would provide adequate protection against any harms to the
switched telephone network from customer-supplied terminals."
29
1
Chairman Wiley continuously hoped that the carriers would volun-
tarily develop their own minimum standards.292 Unfortunately, the
carriers voluntarily refused.
Fourteen years before Carterfone, in In re Jordaphone Corp., 
293
the FCC determined that properly interconnected answering devices
did not pose any threat of harm to the operating telephone net-
work.294 The Jordaphone Commission thus found the foreign at-
291. Id. at 1229-30. Chairman Wiley further stated "My hope and expectation is that an
industry consensus canyet be reached which will permit 'a withering away' or elimination of
this regulatory program." Id. (emphasis added).
292. In this regard, the course of the Registration Program's standards is enlightening.
The plaintiff in United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976) recounted this history
in its Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories:
When the FCC was attempting to ascertain the technical standards which customer-
provided equipment should be required to meet in order to protect the network
against harm and degradation of service, defendants proposed standards of manufac-
ture and performance. These standards were demanding and rigid, and AT&T ex-
plained that they were the minimal standards acceptable to safeguard the network.
The time consumed in the evolution of these standards, and their rigidity and detail,
obstructed the efforts of interconnect manufacturers and suppliers to compete with
defendants in the telecommunications terminal equipment market because the ex-
isting connecting arrangement requirements remained in effect during the pendency
of the Docket.
In November of 1975, the FCC announced that all terminal equipment to be
attached to the network after the effective date of the certification program would
have to meet the standards developed, including equipment manufactured and supplied
by defendant Western Electric. Almost immediately AT&T began to argue/or relaxa-
tion ofthe standards, claiming that they were "'too tough" and would require the expen-
d iture of $200 million in retrofitting before Western Electric equpment could meet them.
Accordingly, plaintiff contends that defendants misrepresented to the FCC both the
dangers involved in permitting the interconnection of customer-provided equipment
and the manufacturing and performance standards required to guard against those
dangers. Plaintiff believes that these representations were made for a number of rea-
sons. First, the standards proposed would be too demanding for interconnect manu-
facturers to meet. Second, attempts by the interconnect industry to meet the
standards would take time and increase the price of their products, thereby delaying
interconnect competition and diminishing its economic attractiveness to potential
customers. Finally, defendant believed that its own equipment would be exempt
from the requirements, and therefore favored by customers. When defendants dis-
covered that the standards which they proposed for application to others were to be
applied to their own offerings they were forced to admit that their own equipment
was incapable of satisfying the standards which they had proposed. Defendants sub-
sequently advocated the adoption of substantially relaxed standards which their
equipment was capable of satisfying.
Id at 240-41. (emphasis added). See also Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 58 FCC 2d 736,
741 (1976).
293. 18 FCC 644 (1954).
294. There is no sound reason, however, why these devices cannot be used at installa-
tions where they will function properly and where local authorities have determined
that a local need for them exists. The record reflects no substantial impairment of the
interstate and foreign toll telephone service or of the intrastate and local service of
the Wisconsin Telephone Company as a result of the action of the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin requiring the Wisconsin Telephone Company to permit
subscribers to continue to use the Electronic Secretary.
Id at 671.
tachment provisions of the telephone company tariffs to be "unjust,
unreasonable and therefore, unlawful to the extent that they may be
interpreted to prohibit the installation and use by the subscriber, of a
telephone answering device not furnished by the telephone com-
pany. .. "295 Bell's conduct forced the FCC to repeat this holding
fourteen years later when a public need and demand was finally
shown.296
Bell claimed that it could not comprehend the Carterfone policy
and that it placed the entire Bell System on the horns of a di-
lemma.2 97 This contention is belied by the evidence,298 but a mis-
conception by a regulated entity is no grounds to repeal an act of
Congress.299 It is not reasonable to believe that Bell thought it was
"opening the network to the widest possible constructive use" by not
providing the very connecting arrangements Bell had promised to
provide, or by delaying the provision of those connecting arrange-
ments, or by providing only connecting arrangements that did not
properly connect, or by substantially refusing effective repair service
to connecting arrangements. It is difficult to understand how Bell
thought that establishing the blatant discrimination involved in the
connecting arrangement tariff would "open the network." Overall, it
does not seem possible that Bell actually thought its conduct ac-
corded with even its own understanding of the Carter/one policy.3"
In any event, Bell's understanding of Carterfone would not support
its claim of antitrust immunity.3 ° '
Moreover, Bell had network standards that could have been
used to distinguish harmless from harmful devices. Indeed, the FCC
295. No public need or demand was found in Jordaphone. Id. at 671. This explains the
limited nature of Jordaphone's holding.
296. Carerfone, 13 FCC 2d 420, reh'g denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968).
297. Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 732 (9th Cir. 1981).
298. Only one day after Carterfone, Bell's president described the new policy quite well:
"to open the network to the widest possible constructive use." See Gilmer Letter, supra note
275.
299. Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716, 745 (9th Cir. 1981).
300. The totality of this conduct is not contained in any tariff. Yet, as the court pointed
out,
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the Commission exercised explicit regulatory
authority over only some segments of the activities challenged in the complaint, it
does not follow that defendants are immune from antitrust liability even with respect
to them. Defendants' purpose is alleged to be the monopolization of the telecommu-
nications service and equipment market, and the bulk of their conduct, including that
revolving around Western Electric and Bell Labs, cannot under any reasonable view
be regarded as immune from antitrust enforcement by virtue of regulation. In that
circumstance, the remainder of the challenged conduct is likewise subject to antitrust
consideration, both because it constitutes a means for achieving an unlawful end
(California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972)), and
because it represents one facet of a larger monopolistic scheme. See Carnation Co. v.
Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 212, 222 (1966); Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 316 (1973).
United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D.D.C. 1978).
301. See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981).
indicated both in the Carterfone decision" 2 and on reconsideration
that it welcomed the establishment and enforcement of standards for
interconnection.0 3 Seven years later, because of Bell's continuous
delaying, the FCC prescribed the standards it originally thought
were in the public interest. In large part, these FCC standards were
taken from Bell's network standards. Therefore, standards that were
available to Bell in 1968 finally became mandatory in 1975 due to
FCC prescription.
Thus, it is clear that antitrust enforcement is reconcilable with
the carrier's obligations under the regulatory act.3°  The statutes in-
302. In Carter/one, the FCC noted, "[T]he carriers may submit new tariffs which will pro-
tect the telephone system against harmful devices, and may specify technical standards if they
wish.'. 14 FCC 2d at 572 n.2 (emphasis added). Even in allowing the post-Carter/one tariffs to
take effect at all, the FCC initiated an informal proceeding. Expressly made a subject of this
inquiry was "consideration of what changes, if any, should be made in the technical criteria
and other conditions for interconnection. ... Foreign Attachment Tariff Revisions, 15 FCC
2d 610, 611 (1968). The end result of this proceeding was to declare the post-Carterfone tariffs
unreasonable and unlawful and to establish the Registration Program. Interstate & Foreign
MTS & WATS, 56 FCC 2d 593 (1975).
303. We found no substantial factors outweighing the necessity of eliminating the
arbitrary tariff. Standards to prevent the introduction ofharmful inputs can be devised
(Tr. 626-627; see also par. 2.6.9. of tariff No. 263 containing a general prohibition
against harmful attachments, and tariff No. 260, par. 2.1.4.(D)), and enforcing them
would be no more difficult than enforcing the present absolute prohibition. . . . The
record also showed that terminal devices may be used under a standard making actual
harm afactor....
Carterfone, 14 FCC 2d 570, 572 n.2 (emphasis added). "We did not prescribe the terms of a
new tariff, but left that to the initiative of the telephone companies, pointing out that they were
in no wise precluded from adopting reasonable standards to prevent harmful interconnection."
ld at 572 (emphasis added).
304. It is clear that antitrust enforcement is not irreconcilable with the carrier's obligations
under the regulatory act. FCC Chairman Richard Wiley, for himself and four other commis-
sioners, described the FCC's role in this situation as follows: "The Commission is confronted
here with the difficult task of assuring that the benefits offull andfair competition will flow to
the public, while- minimizing to the greatest extent possible the intrusion of bureaucracy into
the marketplace." Interstate & Foreign MTS & wATS, 57 FCC 2d 1216, 1229 (1976) (empha-
sis added). The cause of FCC intervention was pointedly stated: "The necessity of a terminal
interconnection program under FCC auspices is directly attributable to the carrier'sfailure to
develop standards and procedures which would provide adequate protection against any harms
to the switched telephone network from customer-supplied terminals." Id at 1229 (emphasis
added). More recently, in an investigation into charges for interstate telephone service, after
noting the narrow and indirect nature of its regulatory authority over Western Electric, see
AT&T, Changes For Interstate Tel. Service, 64 FCC 2d 1 (1977), which comes about solely as
a result of the FCC's authority over interstate service rates, the FCC held, "Moreover, upon
considering this record as a whole, and being particularly mindful of the substantial benefits to
ratepayers resulting from equipment competition, we think the best of all the measures
presented on this record pertaining to Western's efficiency is competition." Id at 23 (empha-
sis added) (footnotes omitted).
In Satellite Business Systems, 62 FCC 2d 774 (1977), the FCC concluded, "Thus, our
regulatees are subject to complementary regulation under both the Communications Act and
the antitrust laws," since the full and fair competition doctrine is fully applicable in this area.
Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 57 FCC 2d at 1229. Similarly, the Commission held in
AT&T (Dataphone) 62 FCC 2d 774 (1977), "[W]e hope to make the 'full and fair competition'
obligation of the carriers consistent with similar obligations imposed pursuant to the antitrust
laws." Id. at 798. Finally, the FCC unmistakably advised the district court in United States ,
"The Commission has never considered its authority over equipment interconnection to dis-
place the antitrust laws." See, e.g., Amicus Brief of FCC at 18, United States v. AT&T, 424 F.
Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976). However, the connecting arrangement tariff itself has been inconsis-
tently applied. Before Carter/one, AT&T adamantly opposed interconnection with foreign
volved in the regulation of the telecommunications industry and the
antitrust laws do not produce differing results when applied to the
same factual situation.3"5 Where the results are the same, the stat-
utes, a fortiori and in fact, are reconcilable.
AT&T has consistently argued3 °" that it has an affirmative obli-
gation under the Communications Act to protect the network from
harm.307 The duty is self-appointed. No such obligation is imposed
by any section of the Act or by any FCC decision.30 8 Rather, the Act
requires AT&T to provide telecommunications services "on request"
without unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory restrictions or prac-
tices.3" 9 Telephone equipment may be provided by AT&T, but
AT&T is not required to "furnish a terminal of any kind as part of
any communications service.
310
VII. A Brief Policy Analysis
A policy analysis suggests a finding that the antitrust and regu-
latory statutes are reconcilable.31' First, the FCC's policies favoring
equipment. The Carter/one decision then struck AT&T's extant tariffs. AT&T promptly re-
placed the illegal tariffs with the post-Carteffone tariffs that purported to allow interconnection
through a connecting arrangement.
The carrier-supplied connecting arrangement tariff works an obvious economic discrimi-
nation since only those subscribers providing their own equipment must pay; those subscribers
provided even identical Bell-supplied equipment were not required to make this payment.
Moreover, the carrier-supplied connecting arrangement requirement did not apply when an
independent telephone company's subscriber used customer-supplied equipment and was not
applied even by Bell to private line customers who provided their own equipment until five
years later. There was no technical justification for this discrimination and the intervening five
years produced no evidence of technical harms by customer-provided equipment used on
either service. See Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 56 FCC 2d 593, 598 (1975):
305. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1975).
306. AT&T has strenuously resisted interconnection on the ground that it has a duty to
protect the network. In Implications of the Telephone Industry's Primary Instrument Concept,
68 FCC 2d 1157, 1163 (1978), the FCC held that there is no such obligation under the Com-
munications Act in the following language:
That the carriers have traditionally furnished the telephones with the service does not
establish that they are required to do so or warrant any inferences about the public
interest. While the definitions contained in Sections 3(a), (b) or (r) of the Communi-
cations Act are sufficiently broad to permit the inclusion of terminal equipment in
interstate communication by wire or radio and in the telephone exchange service,
these definitions do not require that the provision of terminals be a common carrier
service. . . .Nor does the Act contain any requirement that the carrier furnish a
terminal of any kind as part of any communication service. Indeed, the carrier's duty
under Section 201(a) is to furnish service "upon reasonable request"; nowhere in the
Act does the carrier have any right to furnish service or equipment that the customer
does not request or want. . . .[T]o read into the Act any requirement for carrier
terminal offeringe as part of complete service is not justified by the statutory language
and would fly in the face of the Carter/one principle.
307. This has been referred to as an "end-to-end service responsibility." Id at 1164.
308. See Implications of the Telephone Industry's Primary Instrument Concept, 68 FCC
2d 1157, 1163 (1978). See also Second Report and Order, 58 FCC 2d at 741-42 (1976).
309. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
310. AT&T on behalf of Mebane Home Telephone Co., 53 FCC 2d 473, 478 (1975), a f'd
sub nom Mebane Home Telephone Co., FCC, 535 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See note 236
supra.
311. Since its inception, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)-the very embodiment
competition in the interconnect market and the national policy of the
Sherman Act favoring competition would be retarded by holding
AT&T immune from antitrust laws. Moreover, these policies would
be advanced by holding AT&T subject to antitrust laws. Second,
parties injured by AT&T's anti-competitive activities would be with-
out remedy if the antitrust laws were inapplicable.3"2 The tempta-
tion to engage in anti-competitive practices would be aggravated by
holding AT&T immune. Third, immunity would subject AT&T's
unregulated activities 313 to no law. AT&T could act without re-
of a preference for spirited competition-has been a virtual economic charter for our national
economy. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966); Es-
sential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114, 1117 (3d Cir. 1979). Former Anti-
trust Section Chief Donald Turner pertinently noted,
It is of critical importance that the monopoly be confined to [thel minimum area neces-
sary for realizing available economies ofscale, that competitive pressures be preserved
at every level where they might be exerted; and that, in general, conditions which
might induce performance similar to what might be expected in a setting of workable
competition be preserved or created ...
[Elven where transmission exhibits strong economies of scale, and where in con-
sequence monopoly must be accepted, it does not necessarilyfollow-4ndeed, it almost
certainly does notfollow-that the transmission entity should also be authorized tofur-
nish customer equpment on a monopoly-or perhaps any--basis.
Extending the point just made-a monopolist should not be permitted to lever
his way into competitive markets. If a carrier desires, for example, to obtain a manu-
facturing capability either by merger or internal expansion, I would be strongly in-
clined, in general, to block his path. However effective direct regulation can be
made, it cannot be expected to create the same incentives to progressive and efficient
operation that competition would. Indeed it may as a side effect, loosen cost con-
straints and encourage rate-base expansion. Hence, it is extremely important that
competition be maintained wherever possible, so that at some level in the industry com-
petitive incentives are operative.
Turner, The Role ofAntitrust Policy in the Communication Industry, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 873,
877-79 (1968) (emphasis added).
312. The FCC lacks antitrust remedies. The FCC can require a refund of unlawful rates
after a hearing. 47 U.S.C. §§ 204, 205 (1976). But these remedies provide no relief to a com-
petitor who alleges that rates are so low as to be predatory or that practices are unfairly an-
ticompetitive. The Act simply contains no provision for redressing such a wrong, even if the
FCC after hearing finds that the allegations are correct. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 203
n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
313. Western Electric is unregulated. The FCC has always disavowed direct regulatory
control over Western Electric. See FCC, Report on the Investigation ofthe Telephone Industry
in the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); Letter of November 30,
1955, from Chairman of the FCC to Attorney General Brownell in Hearings before the Anti-
trust Subcom. ofthe House Committee ofthe Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Part II, Vol. II at
2233-2234 (1958); id at Vol. III, 3446, 3543 (1959) (testimony of the Chief of the Telephone
Division, FCC); Hearings before the Subcom. on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 281, 283 (1962) (testimony of Chairman Minow,
FCC). The FCC has also maintained that it has no direct control over the distribution of
telephone equipment. For example, the FCC's sole contact with the telephone terminal equip-
ment market and the unregulated Western Electric--the subsidiary participating directly in
that market-is by reason of the FCC's regulation of interstate service rates. AT&T, Charges
for Interstate Tel. Service, 64 FCC 2d 1 (1977). 'The Communications Act gives us no explicit
or direct regulatory responsibility over the non-operating activities and affiliates of the Bell
System." Id at 13 n.21.
At the beginning of his discussion, the ALJ quotes the Trial Staff's statements to the
effect that Western's earnings for Bell System business are subject to a kind of 'indi-
rect' regulatory constraint, since Western's prices become the Bell System's costs and
rate base; and compared with the regulation of the Bell System such "indirect" regu-
lation of Western has necessarily been "narrowly" limited essentially to review of
Western's earnings level. Bell claims in its exceptions that regulation of Western has
straint in these areas.314 Finally, competition in the telecommunica-
tions market will promote innovation, better products, lower prices,
better service, and innumerable other benefits and choices for con-
sumers and prospective entrepreneurs.31 5  The Supreme Court has
summarized these policy considerations most precisely:
[A]ll economic regulation does not necessarily suppress competi-
tion. On the contrary, public utility regulation typically assumes
that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that public con-
trols are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation.
not been "narrow" citing several state public utility decisions. We believe the AU
and Trial Staff correctly describe the scope of regulation of Western. As noted above,
we have no direct regulatory responsibility for the non-operating affiliates. In this
same footnote, Bell excepts to the ALU's characterization of Western as a "monopo-
list" of the Bell System equipment needs. We find the ALJ's characterization is
borne out by this record...
Id at 20 n.31 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See IT&T v. GT&E, 449 F. Supp.
1158, 1169, 1183 (D. Hawaii 1978). "The Commission does not directly regulate the manufac-
ture and supply of telephone equipment or terminal devices used in connection with the tele-
phone system." FCC Amicus Brief at 16, United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C.
1976) (footnote omitted).
314. The FCC does not directly regulate the manufacture and supply of equipment or
devices used in interconnection with the phone system. See note 313 supra. The Commission
does have authority under Title III to require that television sets have all-channel reception
capabilities, 47 U.S.C. § 303(S) (1976), and to regulate radio transmission devices that might
cause interference, 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). This authority does not extend to telephones
however. The Commission's new registration program for telephone terminal devices is based
upon the authority under Title II to require carriers to permit reasonable use of the telephone
if it will not harm the system. See Interstate & Foreign MTS & WATS, 56 FCC 2d 593 (1975).
AT&T has consistently opposed any regulation of Western Electric. Essential Communi-
cation Sys. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979). AT&T claims, however, that antitrust
immunity is proper for Western Electric because "the specific conduct involved in the case has
been committed to regulatory 'control.'" Id There is no explanation of how the unregulated
activities of the unregulated Western Electric were "committed" to such regulatory control.
The FCC has correctly taken the position that its regulatees are subject to antitrust en-
forcement. See AT&T, Charges for Interstate Service, 64 FCC 2d 1 (1977). In Satellite Bus.
Sys., 62 FCC 2d 997 (1977), the FCC stated, "Thus, our regulatees are subject to complemen-
tary regulation under both the Communications Act and the antitrust laws." Id at 1071. See
also AT&T (Dataphone), 62 FCC 2d 774 (1977), wherein the FCC stated, "[W]e hope to make
the 'full and fair competition' obligations of the carrier consistent with similar obligations
imposed pursuant to the antitrust laws..' Id at 798 (citation omitted).
Generally, Western Electric is alleged to be a co-conspirator. Plaintiffs usually claim that
Western Electric manufactured the malfunctioning connecting arrangements, unduly delayed
manufacturing connecting arrangements, and supplied inadequate installation guides and in-
structions. The Supreme Court has plainly and recently held, "[Ain exempt entity forfeits
antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt parties." Group Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979). The purpose of the illegal conduct in Royal
Drug was at least laudable. Health insurance carriers employed a group boycott on behalf of
their subscribers to promote lower prices on drugs; but the boycott harmed drug companies
that refused to give the subscribers the preferred treatment. The Supreme Court held the
action to be an illegal group boycott despite the insurance carrier's contention that the activity
was exempt from antitrust action since it was regulated by various state insurance agencies and
exempt under the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013(b) (1970).
Western would seem to be such a "non-exempt party." Without recourse to the antitrust
laws for Western's monopolistic practices, it would be beyond the law and its victims would be
unable to obtain compensation for wrongs suffered.
315. Economic Implications of Customer Interconnection, 61 FCC 2d 767, 687-681 (1976).
Accord, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). For
an interesting article on the explosion of innovation and competition since Carter/one in the
interconnection equipment market see Burck, Getting to Know the Smart Phone, FORTUNE 134
(Feb. 25, 1980).
There is no logical inconsistency between requiring such a firm to
meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monop-
o powers and also to comply with antitrust standards to the extent
ttit enages in business activity in competitive areas of the
economy. 6
VIII. Conclusion
The applicability of antitrust laws to regulated industries is
solely a matter of legislative intent. Most often, the express inten-
tions of Congress are embodied in antitrust laws and in statutes ex-
pressly repealing antitrust laws. Congress may not always be
explicit, however, and the question of implied antitrust immunity
then may arise. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the implied -repeal of one statute by a later statute occurs only when
there is an affirmative showing of a legislative intent to repeal or
when the two statutes are irreconcilable. Irreconcilability is not
proved, however, simply by showing that the two statutes produce
differing results when applied to the same factual situations. Never-
theless, it does seem clear that if there is no express legislative intent
to repeal and the statutes do not produce differing results, implied
repeal of the antitrust laws is impermissible.
Application of the above analysis to the telecommunications in-
dustry reveals that implied antitrust immunity for telephone compa-
nies is generally inappropriate. No affirmative legislative intent to
displace the antitrust laws exists in the legislative history of telecom-
munication regulation. Nor are the antitrust laws and the regula-
tions under the Communications Act of 1934 irreconcilable in regard
to telephone terminal equipment. Hence, implied repeal of the anti-
trust laws for telephone companies, in this instance, is simply a
'wrong number."
316. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976) (emphasis added).

